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IMPLIED EXCLUSIVE POWERS INTHE ECJ’S POST-LISBON
JURISPRUDENCE:THE CONTINUED DEVELOPMENT OFTHE ERTA
DOCTRINE
MERIJN CHAMON*
Abstract
Already early on in the EU integration process the ECJ accepted the idea
of implied exclusive powers: in ERTA, it ruled that Member States may
lose the power to conclude international agreements if and when the EU
has acted internally on the matter. This idea of “supervening exclusivity”
was further developed in subsequent ECJ case law and finally recognized
in primary law through codification in Article 3(2) TFEU. The present
article reconstructs the Court’s pre-Lisbon jurisprudence using different
building blocks: the telos and nature of supervening exclusivity, the
species of “common rules” and the notion of “affecting”.
Reconceptualizing the ERTA doctrine, the article argues that the ERTA
effect is a form of obstacle pre-emption. In a second part, the article looks
at the (dis)continuity of the application of the ERTA doctrine in the Court’s
post-Lisbon case law, finding that there is coherence in the sense that
obstacle pre-emption is still a valid prism through which to look at the
ERTA doctrine but at the same time the threshold for finding an EU
exclusive competence has been lowered.
1. Introduction
One of the many significant changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, going
back to the Constitutional Treaty, was the recognition of the EU’s implied
exclusive external competence, which finds its origins in the Court’s seminal
ERTA judgment.1 The mechanism of supervening2 exclusivity now foreseen
* Merijn Chamon is postdoctoral researcher of the Research Foundation Flanders (FWO) at
the Ghent European Law Institute, Ghent University (Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence). I
would like to thank Jacques Bourgeois, Peter Van Elsuwege, Marc Maresceau and the
anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions.All errors or omissions remain mine.
1. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), EU:C:1971:32.
2. Following authors such as Dashwood and Rosas, the term “supervening exclusivity” is
used here to denote “implied exclusive competence”. See Dashwood, “Mixity in the era of the
Treaty of Lisbon”, in Hillion and Koutrakos (Eds.),Mixed Agreements Revisited: The EU and
its Member States in the World (Hart Publishing, 2010), p. 360; Rosas, “Exclusive, shared and
Common Market Law Review 55: 1101–1142, 2018.
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in Article 3(2) TFEU triggers an exclusive power for the EU to conclude
international agreements when the EU has exercised its competences
internally.
The Lisbon codification raised a number of questions. A first is whether
and to what extent Article 3(2) TFEU provides for a proper codification of the
ERTA line of cases. This is linked to a complicating factor in that not only the
Treaty authors but also the Court itself engaged in codifying the ERTA
doctrine. The case in point here is Opinion 1/033 delivered by the Court during
the “reflection period” between the rejection of the Constitutional Treaty and
the negotiations on the Lisbon Treaty. When the latter finally entered into
force, two ERTA codifications existed, and the one provided for in Article 3(2)
TFEU was in a sense already outdated, since it could only take into account
pre-Lisbon developments up until Opinion 1/00.4 As a result, a second
question, and one on which the second part of this article will focus, is how
the Treaty codification has been applied by the Court in its post-Lisbon case
law on supervening exclusivity. These questions are of no small importance,
since one of the key aims of the Lisbon Treaty was to contain EU competence
(creep).5 The aim to codify and contain was all the more daunting in respect of
ERTA since it has proved to be one of the most impenetrable doctrines in EU
law, even for the keenest legal minds. As noted below, this not only has to do
with the Court’s often elliptic reasoning, but also with its seemingly
oscillating approach to supervening exclusivity.
In this regard commentators generally point towards a restrictive turn in the
Court’s case law in the 1994 WTO Opinion and the 2002 Open Skies cases,
and a subsequent return to the more generous standard in the 2006 Lugano
Opinion.6 To fully appreciate the Court’s post-Lisbon case law, it is therefore
necessary to conceptualize the ERTA doctrine in the Court’s pre-Lisbon case
national competence in the context of EU external relations: Do such distinctions matter?”, in
Govaere, Lannon, Van Elsuwege and Adam (Eds.), The European Union in the World: Essays
in Honour of Marc Maresceau (Martinus Nijhoff, 2014), p. 18.
3. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, EU:C:2006:81.
4. Opinion 1/00, European Common Aviation Area, EU:C:2002:231.
5. Craig, “Competence: Clarity, conferral, containment and consideration”, 29 EL Rev.
(2004), 323–344.
6. See Mengozzi, “The EC external competencies: From the ERTA case to the Opinion in
the Lugano Convention”, in Maduro and Azoulai (Eds.), The Past and Future of EU Law (Hart
Publishing, 2010), pp. 213–217. Lavranos noted a “shift by the Court from the rather static and
restrictive approach it developed in Opinion 1/94 and theOpen Skies judgments, i.e. the ‘largely
harmonized’ test, towards the more flexible, dynamic ‘effect on Community law’ test.” See
Lavranos, “Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1087–1100, 1095;
Flaesch-Mougin, “Premières décisions relatives à la compétence exclusive de l’Union au titre
de l’article 3, paragraphe 2, TFUE: La Cour confirme la pertinence des critères jurisprudentiels
issus de l’arrêt AETR pour caractériser ‘l’affectation des règles communes”, (2015) RTDE,
220.
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law. As will be shown, this doctrine has undeniably been subject to change
over the years,7 but if one scratches off the veneer of the specific factual
context and the specific phrasing of the legal questions put before the Court in
each individual case,8 there is consistency in the Court’s rulings on
supervening exclusivity. The latter may be seen as preventing the Member
States from acting on the international plane if otherwise the objectives
pursued by common EU rules might be frustrated.
In what follows, the hypothesis that supervening exclusivity may be
conceptualized as obstacle pre-emption will first be proposed. Subsequently,
the pre- and post-Lisbon case law will be deconstructed and
reconceptualized,9 looking at (i) both the telos and nature of the constitutional
mechanism of supervening exclusivity, (ii) the species of common rules that
may trigger exclusivity, (iii) the pivotal notion of “affecting” and (iv) the
Court’s approach in testing whether EU law is affected. Juxtaposing the pre-
and post-Lisbon case law then allows for preliminary conclusions on
continuity and discontinuity in applying the ERTA doctrine.
2. Supervening exclusivity as obstacle pre-emption
While the Court itself never refers to the concept of pre-emption, and that
concept has been hard to trace both in the context of US federal law and even
more so when exported to the EU context, it will be argued here that it may
still help in interpreting and understanding the case law.10 While the
pre-emptive nature of supervening exclusivity is indeed more or less accepted
7. Ontologically, the view taken here is that the Court in cases such as the ILO Opinion,
WTO Opinion, Open Skies, Lugano Opinion, etc. has built on and elaborated one rather than
several doctrines or principles. Contra, see inter alia Klamert, The Principle of Loyalty in EU
Law (OUP, 2014), pp. 106–107; Delgado Casteleiro, “On the scope of EU’s exclusive
competence after the Lisbon Treaty – Comment of the Opinion 1/13 of the Court”’, 51
Rev.der.Com.Eur (2015), 669–684, 677.
8. The argumentation invoked by the parties of course also plays a role. In Opinion 1/94, the
main question which the Commission had asked was whether “the European Community has
the competence to conclude all parts of the GATS and TRIPs”. Probably because of the
Commission’s focus in its argumentation on an exclusive EU competence, the Court actually
answered the question whether “the European Community alone has the competence to
conclude all parts of GATS and TRIPs”.
9. For more traditional chronological discussions, see works cited infra note 20; Castillo de
la Torre, “The Court of Justice and external competences after Lisbon: Some reflections on the
latest case law”, in Eeckhout and Escudero (Eds.), The European Union’s External Action in
Times of Crisis (Hart Publishing, 2016), pp. 142–157.
10. Observing this in general terms, see Timmermans, “ECJ doctrines on competences”, in
Azoulai (Ed.), The Question of Competence in the European Union (OUP, 2014), p. 155.
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in legal doctrine,11 it is possible, but not straightforward,12 to qualify it more
precisely as obstacle pre-emption, necessarily including rule pre-emption,
without going as far as equating field pre-emption. These three types have
been identified by Schütze, drawing from the US federal experience, and may
be described as follows: rule pre-emption occurs when there is an outright
conflict between a national and an EU rule. In contrast, obstacle pre-emption
is when a national rule frustrates the realization of the objectives or purpose of
an EU rule. While obstacle pre-emption also encompasses outright conflicts,
a conflict of rules is not required. The threshold lies at a more abstract level,
requiring that the realization of the objectives pursued by EU legislation are
frustrated. Finally, field pre-emption does not require any kind of conflict of
rules or frustration of objectives and simply shuts out the exercise of national
competence when and if the EU has “occupied the field” in a certain matter.13
What are the practical implications of this doctrinal qualification? This is
easiest illustrated by taking the perspective of the two actors that typically find
themselves at opposing ends before the ECJ: for the Member States it means
that they cannot claim the power to exercise a competence simply by
demonstrating that there is no normative conflict between a(n) (envisaged)
international agreement and the relevant act of EU secondary legislation.
Instead they have to show that the legal regime set up under EU law can in no
11. See inter alia Metz, Die Aussenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union nach dem
Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa: Eine Untersuchung aus kompetenzrechtlicher Sicht
(Duncker und Humblot, 2007), p. 361; Hahn and Dudenhöfer, “AuswärtigeAnnexkompetenzen
interner Politiken”, in Von Arnauld (Ed.), Europäische Außenbeziehungen (Nomos, 2014),
p. 864; Eeckhout, “Exclusive external competences: Constructing the EU as an international
actor”, in The Court of Justice and the Construction of Europe: Analyses and Perspectives on
Sixty Years of Case law (TMC Asser Press, 2013), pp. 626–628; Cremona, “EU external
competence – Rationales for exclusivity”, in Garben and Govaere (Eds.), The Division of
Competences between the EU and the Member States: Reflections on the Past, the Present and
the Future (Hart Publishing, 2017), pp. 144–145; Le Bot, “Précisions sur les compétences
externes implicites après le Traité de Lisbonne”, (2014) R.A.E., 633–640, 636; Dony, “Les
accords mixtes”, in Louis and Dony (Eds.), Le droit de la CE et de l’Union européenne:
Relations extérieures (Bruylant, 2005), p. 174.Contra however, see Timmermans, op. cit. supra
note 10, p. 163. More dubiously, Konstadinidis refers to ERTA as a doctrine of pre-emption, but
qualifies pre-emption as “the external axiom of the principle of EU law primacy”; see
Konstadinidis, “EU foreign policy under the doctrine of implied powers: Codification
drawbacks and constitutional limitations”, 39 EL Rev. (2014), 511–530, 515. On pre-emption,
see also Louis and Brückner, Le droit de la communauté économique européenne: Relations
extérieures (Presses universitaires de Bruxelles, 1980), p. 110; Lang, “The ERTA judgment and
the Court’s case law on competence and conflict”, 6 YEL (1986), 183–218, 200.
12. E.g. Delgado Casteleiro argues that rule pre-emption is at issue when the EU has
engaged in complete harmonization; see Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 7, 680–681.
This seems questionable since rule pre-emption requires an actual conflict of rules, something
which the Court, in instances of complete harmonization, is not actually interested in.
13. See Schütze, “Supremacy without pre-emption? The very slowly emergent doctrine of
community pre-emption”, 43 CML Rev. (2006), 1023–1048, 1034 et seq.
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way be affected in the sense that the attainment of the ultimate objectives of
the EU legal act in question may be frustrated. Conversely, the Commission
cannot simply claim an exclusive competence over a field by showing the EU
has already adopted an act in that area. Instead it has to show that a specific
exercise of (shared) competence by the Member States will frustrate the
functioning of the legal regime set up by a specific act of EU secondary
legislation. In addition, finding supervening exclusivity will not readily result
in the exclusion of the Member States from the entire field, since they are only
pre-empted from adopting certain specific acts. In order to effectively exclude
them from the entire field, the EU must have completely exhausted its
legislative competence in that field. As will be shown below, the Court has
also accepted that Member States are excluded from the field if the EU has
almost completely exhausted its competence to legislate, i.e. if the field is
largely covered by EU common rules.
The above already shows how finding supervening exclusivity may be a
rather subjective affaire. For instance, even if the Member States show that a
certain EU legal regime may continue to function perfectly while Member
States exercise their (shared) competences in parallel, the Court might still
find an ERTA effect by identifying the more abstract (and therefore less
tangible) risk of the objectives of the EU legal regime being jeopardized.
Similarly, in order to exclude Member States from the field, the Commission
will (only) have to show that EU law has largely covered the area, which in
itself is an imprecise standard.
3. The genesis of implied exclusive powers
The ERTA ruling dates from the “foundational period” in EU integration in
which the ECJ constitutionalized the relationship between the Union and the
Member States (a relation hitherto presumed to be governed by international
law).14 Since volumes have already been filled on the ERTA judgment itself, it
will not be presented again here. It suffices to note instead that in the very first
inter-institutional dispute before the Court, the judges found that there was no
need for an express provision in the Treaties granting the EU the competence
to conclude international agreements. Rather, such a competence could flow
implicitly from a Treaty provision or even from secondary law measures.15
Without properly distinguishing between the existence and the nature of a
competence, the Court added that when common rules are adopted through
secondary legislation, the Member States lose the power to assume obligations
14. Weiler, “The transformation of Europe”, 100 The Yale Law Journal (1991), 2413–2417.
15. Case 22/70, Commission v. Council (ERTA), para 16.
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which affect those common rules or alter their scope.16 The Court could be
brief on the issue of the regulation being affected since the basic set-up and
several provisions of the ERTA agreement were in direct conflict with it.17
Based on the ERTA case itself, one could argue that supervening exclusivity is
the result of rule pre-emption (two rules being in outright conflict), but as will
be noted below, the Court later clarified that supervening exclusivity does not
require a conflict of rules.
The Lisbon Treaty partially (see further below) codified the ERTA doctrine
in Article 3(2) TFEU, spelling out that the “Union shall also have exclusive
competence for the conclusion of an international agreement … in so far as its
conclusion may affect common rules or alter their scope.” Even if the Court in
its case law indeed refers to exclusive competences, the codification remains
problematic since the competences at issue in anERTA test are actually shared
competences (and remain so),18 while the exercise of these competences by
the Member States may be pre-empted, i.e. the power being exclusively vested
in the EU.19 As will be shown below, this issue is more than a mere legal nicety
or clever semantics and instead has significant repercussions for the vertical
delimitation of competences in the EU.
4. Pre-Lisbon development and reception of the ERTA doctrine
To understand how the Court has engaged with the ERTA codification in
Article 3(2) TFEU, it is necessary to set out how the doctrine had developed
prior to the Lisbon Treaty. Rather than following a chronological sequence,20
the Court’s case law will be presented along thematic lines: what are the telos
16. Ibid. para 17.
17. The Regulation’s scope was determined territorially, while that of ERTA is (still)
determined on a nationality basis. The UN Economic Commission for Europe is still working
on the alignment of both instruments. See ECE Inland Transport Committee, “AETR discussion
paper (Roadmap)”, 20/12/2011, ECE/TRANS/2012/3.
18. Contra, see Castillo de la Torre, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 158 and 162; Timmermans, op.
cit. supra note 10, pp. 162–163.
19. For one of the few other commentators making this point, see Truë, “Das System der
EU-Kompetenzen vor und nach dem Entwurf eines Europäischen Verfassungsvertrags”, 64
ZaöRV (2004), 391–427, 414–415. For the critical distinction between powers and
competences, see Constantinesco, Compétences et pouvoirs dans les Communautés
européennes: Contribution à l’étude de la nature juridique des communautés (Librairie
Générale de Droit et de Jurisprudence, 1974), pp. 82–83.
20. For such an account of the development of the ERTA jurisprudence, see inter alia
Neframi, L’action extérieure de l’Union européenne: Fondements, moyens, principes (LGDJ,
2010), pp. 59–67; Holdgaard, External Relations Law of the European Community: Legal
Reasoning and Legal Discourses (Kluwer Law International, 2008), pp. 97–116.
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and nature of supervening exclusivity; what are “common EU rules”; what is
meant by common rules being “affected” and how does the Court test this?
4.1. The telos of the mechanism of supervening exclusivity
Looking at supervening exclusivity as a constitutional mechanism that
coordinates the external action of the national and EU levels of government,21
raises the question what the purpose of this mechanism is. In ERTA, the ECJ
was not entirely clear on this, referring to the need to safeguard “the unity of
the Common Market and the uniform application of Community law.”22 In
Opinion 1/03 the Court was explicit, finding that the “purpose … is primarily
to preserve the effectiveness of Community law and the proper functioning of
the systems established by its rules.”23 Yet, if that were indeed the ultimate
telos of the ERTA doctrine, Eeckhout and De Baere argue that the Court in
ERTA might also have opted for a simple application of the principle of
primacy,24 leaving the Member States the freedom to pursue external relations
and only afterwards striking down any problematic agreements, thereby
requiring them to resolve any legal issues arising under international law.
Arguably there should therefore be something more to the ERTA doctrine.
According to Bourgeois, ERTA thus also served “to safeguard the
Community ‘legislators’ freedom to alter [common EU] rules or to regulate
the field further.”25 In Opinion 2/91, however, the Commission’s plea for an
exclusive EU competence in order to safeguard the future development of EU
law was rejected by the Court, this concern being relegated to the status of a
21. See Schütze, Foreign Affairs and the EU Constitution: Selected Essays (Cambridge
University Press, 2014), p. 173.
22. Case 22/70, ERTA, para 31.
23. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, paras. 128 and 131 (emphasis added). See also infra
note 33.
24. De Baere, Constitutional Principles of EU External Relations (OUP, 2008), p. 43;
Eeckhout, EU External Relations Law (OUP, 2011), p. 76. In contrast, Kovar noted that “la
contradiction entre une réglementation interne à la Communauté et des engagements
internationaux souscrits par les Etats membres pourrait, difficilement, être réglée par le recours
au principe de la primauté du droit communautaire.” See Kovar, “L’affaire de l’A.E.T.R. devant
la Cour de Justice des Communautés européennes et la compétence internationale de la C.E.E.”,
17 Annuaire Français de Droit International Année (1971), 386–418, 404.
25. Bourgeois, “Some comments on the practice”, and for other authors who stressed the
need for exclusivity to safeguard the future development of EU law, Pescatore, “Contribution to
the discussion”, both in Timmermans and Völker (Eds.), Division of Powers between the
European Communities and their Member States in the Field of External Relations (Kluwer,
1981), p. 104 and p. 75 respectively; Lenaerts, “Les répercussion des compétences de la
Communauté européenne sur les compétences externes des Etats membres et la question de
‘preemption’”, in Demaret (Ed.), Relations extérieures de la Communauté européenne et
marché intérieur: Aspects juridiques et fonctionnels (Story-Scientia, 1986), p. 59; Louis and
Brückner, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 111.
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practical difficulty that cannot affect the competence question.26 Nonetheless,
in the Open Skies cases, Advocate General Tizzano also identified a
prospective purpose of the ERTA doctrine by citing, questionably,27 almost
verbatim from the Court’s 1/75 Opinion.
Advocate General Tizzano thus ruled out a competence on the part of the
Member States to “adopt positions which differ from those which the [EU]
intends to adopt.”28 The Court only slightly picked up on this in its Opinion on
the Lugano Convention when it clarified that an ERTA effect should not
simply be assessed taking into account the current state of the law “but also its
future development, insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that
analysis.”29 The addition that future developments ought to be foreseeable
underscores that the forward-looking perspective only informs the analysis of
EU law being possibly affected allowing the Court to take into account
political agreements in Council but probably not mere Commission proposals
not the purpose of theERTA doctrine.After all, any prospective function of the
ERTA doctrine would be based on the assumption that spill-back in EU
integration is (at the most) a theoretical possibility. Following the Lisbon
Treaty, however, Article 2(2) TFEU inter alia provides that in areas of shared
competence, the “Member States shall again exercise their competence to the
extent that the Union has decided to cease exercising its competence.”30
26. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention, EU:C:1993:106, paras. 19–20; Opinion 2/00,
Cartagena Protocol, EU:C:2001:664, para 41; Opinion 1/94, GATS and TRIPs,
EU:C:1994:384, para 107; Opinion 1/08, GATS, EU:C:2009:739, para 127. In Ruling 1/78
(under the Euratom Treaty), the Court did take into account the risk of compromising the
subsequent development of Euratom law, but only to find that Euratom ought not to be excluded
from the IAEA convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials – not to find an
exclusive Euratom competence. See Ruling 1/78,Draft Convention of the InternationalAtomic
Energy Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports,
EU:C:1978:202, para 23. However, relying on Ruling 1/78 to argue that ERTA preserves the
future action of the EU, see Castillo de la Torre, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 164.
27. The reference seems misplaced since Opinion 1/75, Local cost standard,
EU:C:1975:145, dealt with the Common Commercial Policy which the Court confirmed in that
Opinion comes under an a priori exclusive competence.
28. Opinion of A.G. Tizzano in Case C-466/98,Commission v.UK, EU:C:2002:63, para 64
(emphasis added).
29. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 126. Not all commentators had noted this
addition to the ERTA doctrine, but see McLean, “ECJ advisory Opinion 1/03”, in Pocar (Ed.),
The External Competence of the European Union and Private International Law (CEDAM,
2007), pp. 34–35. It may further be noted that in Opinion 1/94, GATS and TRIPs, the Court
dismissed the relevance of proposed EU legislation; see para 103.
30. Edjaharian thus correctly notes that the pre-emption resulting from the adoption of EU
law under shared competences is never definitive. See Vérane Edjaharian, “Les compétences
dans le Traité de Lisbonne: La constitutionnalisation de l’Union européenne interrogée”, in
Brosset, Chevalier-Govers, Edjaharian and Schneider (Eds.), Le Traité de Lisbonne:
Reconfiguration ou déconstitutionnalisation de l’union européenne (Bruylant, 2009), p. 239.
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Taking into account the possible future development of EU law might then be
turned into an argument for mixity instead of supervening exclusivity.31
One way to make sense of supervening exclusivity in legal terms is to argue
that ensuring the “effectiveness of Community law and the proper functioning
of the systems established by its rules”32 and protecting the integrity of a
coherent and uniform legal space which is (being) built in the EU legal order
require exclusivity.33 While these values might in theory also be safeguarded
by a vigorous enforcement of the principle of supremacy, it would be
ineffective (i.e. disproportionate) to rely simply on primacy. This “cloak of
proportionality” is necessary for it to become a legal argument, given that the
Court consistently rejects practical arguments as immaterial to solve
competence questions.34 The more severe repercussions for Member States’
competences prescribed by Article 3(2) TFEU, compared to those prescribed
by Article 2(2) TFEU,35 are then to be understood in light of the different
nature of international agreements compared to internal national laws.36
4.2. The nature of supervening exclusivity
A related question which has received less attention in legal doctrine, and
none whatsoever by the Court, relates to the nature of supervening exclusivity,
assuming that it is not simply an application of the supremacy principle (see
31. This since to take into account the possibility that the exercise of a shared competence
returns to the national level (and no affected EU rules would exist), Members States would have
to be involved (next to the EU) in the conclusion of the international agreement.
32. In his discussion of Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, McLean notes that the Court
uses different variations on this mantra throughout its Opinion. See McLean, op. cit. supra note
29, pp. 32–33.
33. Post, “Constructing the European polity: ERTA and the Open Skies judgments”, in
Maduro and Azoulai, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 242.
34. See supra note 26.
35. Both provisions prescribe a pre-emption of Member State action, but Art. 2(2) TFEU
recognizes that Member States still have a competence, whereas Art. 3(2) TFEU denies any
competence for the Member States. According to Metz, both provisions govern the same issue.
See Metz, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 361. Eeckhout and Rosas argue that both are similar but that
Art. 3(2) TFEU constitutes a lex specialis; see Eeckhout, op. cit. supra note 11, pp. 627–628,
and Rosas, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 23, note 22. As Cremona notes however, the relation between
these two provisions is not spelled in the Treaties; Cremona, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 145. This
also left the necessary scope for the Court to rule in Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council
(Neighbouring Rights), EU:C:2014:2151, that Protocol No. 25 is immaterial for the purpose of
applying Art. 3(2) TFEU, see infra note 117. Disagreeing with Metz and emphasizing that
exclusivity under Art. 3(2) TFEU is different from Art. 2(2) TFEU, see Timmermans, op. cit.
supra note 10, p. 163.
36. Castillo de la Torre, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 158–160.
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above).37 Although this is ignored by the majority of commentators,38 the
Court in ERTA borrowed its language from earlier case law when defining the
trigger for exclusivity. In the 1970 Bollmann case, the Court noted that “all
Member States … unless otherwise expressly provided, are precluded from
taking steps, for the purposes of applying the regulation [on the common
organization of the market in poultry meat], which are intended to alter its
scope or supplement its provisions … Member States [are not permitted] to
adopt any internal measures affecting the scope of the regulation itself.”39 As
the Court did not emphasize any substantive conflict between the national and
EU measure,40 its finding in Bollmann can be qualified as a typical
application of legislative field pre-emption.41 Where Bollmann was an
internal case on the Common Agricultural Policy, Lenaerts also qualified the
exclusivity resulting from the ERTA doctrine as field pre-emption.42 Both
Bourgeois and Weiler have argued that the ERTA doctrine constituted ab initio
something between field pre-emption and simple supremacy: supervening
exclusivity was not a matter of excluding Member State action from the entire
field in which an EU act had been adopted, neither was it restricted to pushing
out only those national measures in direct conflict with the EU act.43 Precisely
identifying the nature of supervening exclusivity ultimately depends on when
the Court finds EU law (not) to be affected.The analysis on the latter issue (see
below) points towards obstacle pre-emption, i.e. supervening exclusivity is
required since Member State action would interfere with the proper
37. However, Heliskoski does find that the ERTA effect comes down to primacy. See
Heliskoski,MixedAgreements as a Technique for Organizing the International Relations of the
European Community and its Member States (Kluwer Law International, 2001), pp. 30 and 68.
38. See however Louis and Brückner, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 110; Lang, op. cit. supra note
11, 200.
39. Case 40/69, Bollmann, EU:C:1970:12, paras. 4–5 (emphasis added).
40. Berardis, “The Common Organization of Agricultural Markets and National Price
Regulations”, 17 CML Rev. (1980), 539–551, 540.
41. Schütze, op. cit. supra note 13, 1040–1041.
42. In this regard, Lenaerts stressed that the Court in ERTA prohibited the Member States
from taking any steps outside the EU framework. According to Lenaerts the original ERTA
doctrine was to be understood as precluding Member State competence related “au sense le plus
large au même domaine, même si l’objet précis d’un engagement international que voudrait
contracter un Etat membre avec un pays tiers, n’est pas couvert par l’objet ou la portée de
l’action communautaire.” However he also foretold that the Court might attenuate the doctrine
with regard to its most severe repercussions for national competence, see Lenaerts, op. cit.
supra note 25, pp. 58–60.Also referring to field pre-emption, see Verellen, “TheERTA doctrine
in the post-Lisbon era: Note under judgment inCommission v.Council (C-114/12) and Opinion
1/13”, 21 CJEL (2015), 383–410, 407, note 80.
43. Bourgeois, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 105; Weiler, “The external legal relations of
non-unitary actors: Mixity and the federal principle”, in O’Keeffe and Schermers (Eds.),Mixed
Agreements (Kluwer, 1983), p. 72.
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functioning or the realization of the objectives of EU legislation.44 Conversely,
looking at the ERTA effect as resulting from obstacle pre-emption helps
understand why the Court finds supervening exclusivity even in cases where
EU law is not affected in the ordinary sense of the word.
4.3. The species of common rules that may be affected in the sense of
ERTA
In its original ruling, the Court found an exclusive EU competence because
common EU rules adopted to implement one of the common policies were
affected. This inter alia raised the questions when a rule constitutes a
“common” rule in the sense of the ERTA and whether the ruling only applied
to rules adopted under the two “common” policies foreseen in the EEC
Treaty.45 As regards the latter, doctrine and practice already early on argued
against such a restrictive interpretation of the ruling46 and the Court later
followed suit.47 In its Opinion 2/91, the Court refuted a restrictive reading put
forward by some of the Member States and confirmed that the “common
rules” in ERTA were to be understood as all secondary legislation.48 This
clarification has been codified by the Lisbon Treaty, since Article 3(2) TFEU
limits itself to referring to “common rules” omitting any reference to the field
in which these are adopted.
Although the Court in ERTA noted that “the form these [common rules]
may take” is irrelevant,49 it remains unclear whether, apart from typical
internal secondary legislation, an international agreement itself could
44. Schütze has defined this type of pre-emption for the EU’s internal sphere. See Schütze,
European Constitutional Law (Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 366; Schütze, op. cit.
supra note 13, 1041.
45. Louis and Brückner, op. cit. supra note 11, pp. 97–98.
46. Hardy, “Opinion 1/76 of the Court of Justice: The Rhine case and the Treaty-making
powers of the Community”, 14 CML Rev. (1977), 561–600, 588–589. See also Timmermans
who argued that the EEC had become a party to the Bonn Convention for the protection of the
Rhine against Chemical pollution because this convention affected the provisions of a directive
adopted pursuant to Art. 352 TFEU. See Timmermans, “Division of external powers between
Community and Member States in the field of harmonization of national law – A case study”,
in Timmermans and Völker, op. cit. supra note 25, pp. 17–19. Contra see authors cited in
Kovar, “La contribution de la Cour de Justice au développement de la condition internationale
de la communauté européenne”, 14 CDE (1978), 527–573, 536.
47. However, Michel argues that while the aspect of common rules is not relevant for
determining the existence of an external competence it still is for determining the nature of that
competence, see Michel, “Les compétences externes implicites: Continuité jurisprudentielle et
clarification méthodologique”, 10 Europe (2006), para 10.
48. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention, paras. 10–11.
49. Kovar notes that some even argued that the common rules could only be regulations (and
not directives or decisions); see Kovar, op. cit. supra note 46, 537.
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constitute a common rule.50 On the one hand, that would seem logical since
the Court in Haegeman found that agreements concluded by the EU form an
integral part of EU law.51 However, the Inland Waterway cases could be read
against this view52 and it might also result in what has been termed a reverse
ERTA effect – which Member States have sought to preclude by insisting on
EU agreements being concluded as mixed agreements.53 Restrictively
interpreting the notion of “common rules” may then assuage this fear of the
Member States and could also contribute to distinguishing Article 2(2) TFEU
from Article 3(2) TFEU.
A second question is whether the legal basis used to adopt the common rule
in question is in any way relevant. Looking at the ERTA doctrine as resulting
in exclusive competence one would at first be inclined to answer this question
affirmatively: a competence cannot be exclusive, unless it exists and whether
it exists is determined by a legal basis.54 In Opinion 1/03 however, the Court
found that the legal basis is “irrelevant in determining whether an
international agreement affects Community rules: the legal basis of internal
legislation is determined by its principal component, whereas the rule which
may possibly be affected may be merely an ancillary component of that
legislation.”55 The Court’s (correct) finding thereby underscores that ERTA is
about obstacle pre-emption rather than exclusive competence as such. After
all, a common EU rule may pursue different objectives but the legal basis,
under the absorption doctrine, will be determined only by the act’s main
objective.
50. See Klamert, op. cit. supra note 7, p. 186. Cremona, Gilsdorf, Groux and Dashwood and
Heliskoski have argued that this is possible. See Cremona, “EU external relations: Unity and
conferral of powers”, in Azoulai (Ed.), op. cit. supra note 10, p. 70; Dashwood and Heliskoski,
“The classic authorities revisited”, in Dashwood and Hillion (Eds.), The General Law of EC
External Relations (Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), p. 14; Groux, “Le parallelisme des compétences
internes et externes de la Communauté européenne”, 14 CDE (1978), 1–31, 24; Gilsdorf, “Die
Außenkompetenzen der EG im Wandel – Eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Praxis und
Rechtsprechung”, 31 EuR (1996), 145–166, 149.
51. See Case 181/73,Haegeman, EU:C:1974:41, para 5. See Heliskoski, op. cit. supra note
37, p. 43.
52. In these infringement cases the Court ruled that Germany and Luxembourg had not
violated any EU exclusive competence (see infra note 66), despite the Council having mandated
the Commission to enter into international negotiations with the same third countries on the
same policy issue. Of course, the fact that for the ERTA test the future development of EU law
also needs to be taken into account was only clarified by the Court in Opinion 1/03, ruled one
year later than the Inland Waterway cases.
53. Dashwood, “Why continue to have mixed agreements at all?”, in Bourgeois (Ed.), La
Communauté européenne et les accords mixtes (Presses interuniversitaires européennes, 1997),
p. 96.
54. See inter alia, Holdgaard, op. cit. supra note 20, pp. 106–107.
55. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 131.
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A third question is whether ERTA would also be triggered when a Treaty
provision (i.e. primary law) would be affected.56 These issues were not
clarified by the codification in Article 3(2) TFEU since the latter simply
borrows the Court’s terminology, referring to “common rules” that may be
affected or the scope of which is altered.
4.4. The notion of “affecting”
It follows from ERTA that a concurrent exercise of external competence by the
Member States is ruled out when the (envisaged) international agreement
affects existing EU rules or alters their scope.57 It was a matter of debate
however whether this meant that Member States were barred from concluding
international agreements when the EU had acted in an area or whether a
concurrent competence in the same area could still be exercised by the
Member States insofar as EU rules were not effectively affected or their scope
not being effectively altered.58 As noted above, whether ERTA resulted in field
pre-emption depended on how the Court would understand the notions of
affecting and altering.59 In turn, the answer to that question is informed by the
telos of the mechanism of supervening exclusivity,60 which the Court in its
Lugano Opinion identified as the preservation of the effectiveness of EU law
and the proper functioning of the systems established under EU law,61 or, more
abstractly, protecting the integrity of a coherent and uniform EU legal space.
Following ERTA, the Court clarified in its Opinion 1/94 and Open Skies
cases, that affecting is a legal notion in the sense that it will have to be shown
that the full application of EU law may be affected.62 That economic activity
and competition in the internal market may be affected by Member States
56. Arguing that it would, see Gilsdorf, op. cit. supra note 50, 147; Louis, “La compétence
de la CE de conclure des accords internationaux”, in Louis and Dony, op. cit. supra note 11,
p. 60.
57. Case 22/70, ERTA, para 22. As Dashwood and Heliskoski note, “altering the scope”
does not add anything to the notion of EU law being affected, see Dashwood and Heliskoski, op.
cit. supra note 50, p. 5.
58. Emiliou, “Towards a clearer demarcation line? The division of external relations power
between the Community and Member States”, 21 EL Rev. (1994), 76–86, 84.
59. Several authors had addressed this question, see inter aliaKovar, op. cit. supra note 24,
401; Lang, op. cit. supra note 11, 200 et seq.
60. See for instance Bourgeois, op. cit. supra note 25, p. 101.
61. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 128.
62. Also in Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention, para 18. Lang correctly noted that, strictly
legally speaking, national law cannot “affect” EU law and it should therefore be understood as
meaning “‘affect in practice’or ‘affect the operation of’.” See Lang, op. cit. supra note 11, 201.
It is therefore only a legal notion insofar as we make abstraction of the principle of primacy.
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concluding incongruent international agreements cannot trigger an exclusive
power on the part of the EU.63
Because different Member States had exchanged (in parallel with each
other) fifth freedom rights with the US (i.e. the right to transport passengers
between those Member States and another EU Member State on flights to or
from the US) the Commission argued inOpen Skies that the EU regulations on
air carrier licences and access to intra-EU air routes were affected. Practically
speaking, the Commission was of course correct. It seems nonsensical to
define a set of rules governing EU air carriers’ access to EU air routes if
afterwards all Member States may bilaterally grant access to (part of the) EU
air routes to third country air carriers. Legally speaking however, a
nonsensical system can still function properly and the bilateral agreements in
casu did not constitute an obstacle to the proper implementation of the EU
rules in question.64 The Inland Waterways infringement cases against
Germany and Luxembourg provide further support for viewing supervening
exclusivity as obstacle pre-emption. In these cases, the Commission had
argued that the EU had acquired an exclusive competence to negotiate and
conclude international agreements on cabotage, since the EU legislature had
laid down common rules in Regulation 3921/91. In essence, the Court
dismissed this assertion by noting that the Regulation only pursued the
objective of harmonizing the conditions of cabotage by EU companies.65
Agreements or undertakings in relation to non-EU companies to carry on
cabotage then could not undermine the Regulation’s aim and hence no effect
in the legal sense of ERTA could be found. While the Court’s reasoning in
these cases may appear excessively legalistic, it may be squared with obstacle
pre-emption, since the Court focused on whether there would be any
interference with the purpose for which the common EU rules in casu were
adopted. Of course, had the Court defined the purpose of the common rules at
a more abstract level, it could well have found an obstacle.
The Court arguably extended theERTA doctrine inCommission v.Greece to
also cover the submission to an international body of proposals on the proper
implementation of existing international agreements.66 At first sight, a mere
63. Opinion 1/94,GATS andTRIPs, paras. 78–79; Case C-467/98,Commission v.Denmark
(“Open Skies”), EU:C:2002:625, para 85.
64. In Opinion 1/94, GATS and TRIPs, the Court did not even reach this stage in its
reasoning since it found (in relation to GATS) that not all transport matters were covered by
existing EU rules in the first place and (in relation to TRIPs) that EU harmonization had been
partial at best. See Opinion 1/94, paras. 77 and 103.
65. Case C-266/03, Commission v. Luxembourg, EU:C:2005:341, para 46; Case C-433/03,
Commission v. Germany, EU:C:2005:462, para 48.
66. Cremona, “Extending the reach of the AETR principle: Comment on Commission v.
Greece (C-45/07)”, 34 EL Rev. (2009), 754–668, 768.
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proposal67 for the adoption of binding or non-binding measures can hardly
affect EU law. However, if one looks at the ERTA effect in light of obstacle
pre-emption, the outcome of the case looks more natural. In casu the
Commission had objected to Greece submitting proposals to the IMO in its
own capacity, arguing it had thereby violated the EU’s exclusive competence
(in light of the EU Regulation on enhancing ship and port facility security).
The Court agreed with the Commission, noting that Greece had set in motion
a procedure that could lead to the adoption of new rules68 and that such new
rules would have an effect on EU legislation since the latter incorporated the
relevant IMO measures into EU law.69 While this incorporation means that
any change to the international agreement automatically affects EU
legislation,70 it does not settle the question why the mere possibility of an
amendment should be equated with an actual amendment. In fact, the key to
this issue is provided more cogently by Advocate General Bot than by the
Court itself, as he found that by adopting the relevant EU regulation “the [EU]
legislature intended that the objective of ensuring [the security of EU
shipping] should be met by common rules at [EU] level”,71 and that the
Regulation itself foresees that it is “intended to provide a basis for the
harmonized interpretation and implementation and [EU] monitoring of
the [relevant IMO measures].”72 In light of this, Member States are simply
pre-empted from taking any action that could be an obstacle to the realization
of the Regulation’s objective.
For the purpose of applying the ERTA doctrine then, Member State action
affects common EU rules when such action jeopardizes the attainment of the
objectives or the realization of the aims or purpose of those common rules. For
the actual ERTA test, this formulation already highlights two points:
(i) identifying the objectives, aims and purpose of a common rule is not a
purely objective matter and judges might be required to second guess the
67. The fact that it had only submitted a proposal was evidently emphasized by Greece, and
surely was convincing if the Court were to focus on EU law being actually affected. See also
Boisson, “Compétences respectives de l’UE et des États membres en matière de sécurité
maritime”, (2010) Droit maritime français, 671–676, 673.
68. Amendments to the IMO’s ISPS code can either be binding (incorporation in part A) or
non-binding (incorporation in part B). However, the EU Regulation requires EU Member States
to adhere to both parts A and B.
69. Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece, EU:C:2009:81, paras. 21–22.
70. This is a fourth case in which an ERTA effect can be automatically assumed in addition
to the three examples identified by the Court in Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention.
71. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-14/07,Commission v.Greece, EU:C:2008:642, para 32.
72. Art. 1(2), Regulation (EC) 725/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
31 March 2004 on enhancing ship and port facility security, O.J. 2004, L 129/6.
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intention of the legislature; (ii) the determination whether objectives, aims or
purpose are jeopardized adds a further layer of subjectivity.73
4.5. Testing and finding an ERTA effect
In some cases, testing for anERTA effect is a straightforward affaire. It follows
from the Court’s case law that there are instances in which EU law is
necessarily affected and other instances in which this may be categorically
ruled out.
4.5.1. Per se (no) ERTA effect
Thus, in its Opinion 2/91 the Court definitively threw out the idea that ERTA
amounted to full-blown field pre-emption by finding that the ILO Convention
(laying down minimum rules) could not affect existing EU directives in the
sense of ERTA, since the purpose of these directives was to define a level of
minimum harmonization,74 an objective that could not be frustrated by
international agreements providing a more generous level of protection.75
As a mirror image of this, the Court in Opinion 1/94 on GATS and TRIPs
found that when the EU legislature has enacted exhaustive harmonization
measures,76 EU competence in this area becomes exclusive,77 the objective of
such measures typically being to define one single set of rules. The Court
further added that EU rules necessarily result in exclusive EU competence
when they contain provisions on the treatment of third country nationals or
73. The fact that the Court has a significant margin of discretion in testing for an ERTA
effect would seem inevitable in light of the ERTA doctrine amounting to obstacle pre-emption.
In relation to pre-emption in the US, Lenaerts has also noted the subjectivity and opaqueness of
the Supreme Court’s decisions. See Lenaerts, Constitutie en Rechter: De rechtspraak van het
Amerikaanse Opperste Gerechtshof, het Europese Hof van Justitie en het Europese Hof voor de
Rechten van de Mens (Kluwer, 1983), pp. 146–154. In the US however, the subjectivity results
from the difficult task of identifying the intent of Congress when it adopts federal legislation.
In the EU however, the ECJ seems less concerned with the intent of the EU legislature, though
that does not make the identification of the objective of EU legislation any less subjective.
74. Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention, para 18.
75. Conversely, the ILO Convention also only set a minimum level of protection, ruling out
the risk that Member States would be forced (under the Convention) to go below the level of
protection defined in the EU directives.
76. This situation was at issue in Opinion 1/03 where the Court, following a questionable
interpretation of Art. 4 of the Regulation, could rule that the Brussels Regulation formed a
uniform, unified and coherent system of rules. See Opinion 1/03,LuganoConvention, para 151.
See however Mengozzi who concludes that the Court found exclusive EU competence because
the Regulation “includes ‘provisions relating to the treatment of nationals of non-member
countries’”, in Mengozzi, op. cit. supra note 6, p. 217.
77. Opinion 1/94, GATS and TRIPs, para 96; Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the
OECD on national treatment, EU:C:1995:83, para 33; Case C-467/98, Commission v.
Denmark, para 84.
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empower the EU institutions to negotiate with third countries.78 In Opinion
1/03, the Court clarified that these three situations are only examples.79 It may
be argued that the Court in Commission v. Greece added a fourth such
situation,80 i.e. when EU legislation incorporates international law
instruments,81 as was arguably also at issue in the post-Lisbon OIV case.82 In
the last three scenarios, the international component is elevated to an objective
of the common EU rules itself, which will automatically result in obstacle
pre-emption. The Lisbon Treaty stopped short of codifying these different
scenarios since only the third one may be found in Article 3(2) which provides
for an exclusive competence “for the conclusion of an international agreement
when its conclusion is provided for in a legislative act of the Union.”
4.5.2. A methodology for finding an ERTA effect
In other cases, where the risk that EU law is affected cannot automatically be
assumed to exist, further analysis is needed. In didactic fashion, the Court in
Opinion 1/03 codified its ERTA case law and expounded for the first time on
the methodology of the ERTA test. Thus, “any competence, especially where it
is exclusive and not expressly conferred by the Treaty, must have its basis in
conclusions drawn from a specific analysis of the relationship between the
agreement envisaged and the Community law in force and from which it is
clear that the conclusion of such an agreement is capable of affecting the
Community rules.”83 That analysis will require the Court to look into the
subject area covered by the international agreement to verify whether there is
a counterpart in EU law. While the nominal qualification of the area
78. Opinion 1/94, GATS and TRIPs, para 95; Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the
OECD on national treatment, para 33; Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark, para 83.
79. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 121.
80. Case C-45/07, Commission v. Denmark, para 22.
81. In Intertanko, such an incorporation was also at issue, but the ECJ first found that the
EU was not bound by MARPOL since there had not been a full transfer of powers from the
Member States to the EU, and noted that the incorporation of certain MARPOL provisions in
Directive 2005/35 did not alter this. See Case C-308/06, Intertanko, EU:C:2008:312, paras.
49–50. However, Intertanko predates Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece. In addition,
Intertanko centered on the question whether the legality of an EU directive could be reviewed
in light of an international agreement to which the EU was not a party. A.G. Kokott
distinguished this question from the question of exclusivity; see Opinion of A.G. Kokott in
Case C-308/06, Intertanko, EU:C:2007:689, paras. 42–43.
82. The ECJ was not explicit on this, since it was only asked by Germany to deal with the
procedural issue of whether the Council could have relied on Art. 218(9) TFEU. However, the
Council seemed to assume an exclusive competence was at issue, see Case C-399/12,Germany
v. Council, EU:C:2014:2258, para 43. So did the A.G., although he explicitly noted that he
could “leave open here the question whether the European Union does have exclusive material
competence in the present case.” See Opinion of A.G. Cruz Villalón in Case C-399/12,
Germany v. Council, EU:C:2014:289, note 83.
83. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 124.
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concerned may seem important at first sight, it does not seem determinative
for the subsequent assessment of finding an ERTA effect. For instance, when
the Court in Opinion 1/94 verified whether the TRIPS agreement affected EU
law, it did not define the relevant area in general as “trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights” but instead went into more detail, following
which it could find that there were no relevant EU measures in areas such as
patents and industrial designs.84
4.5.3. EU law may be affected without there being a conflict of rules
Just as it rejected the idea of wholesale field pre-emption, the Court in
Opinion 2/91 also clarified that ERTA is not simply about rule pre-emption,
even if an outright conflict, such as in the originalERTA case, would also result
in an ERTA effect. Although it noted a certain misalignment between the ILO
Convention and existing EU law,85 it found explicitly against the need for the
provisions of an international agreement to contradict the common EU rules
for the latter to be affected in the ERTA sense. Instead, a finding of overlap
was sufficient insofar as it could not be excluded that the realization of the
directives’ objectives could be frustrated by applying the Convention. This
indeed linked with the language used in (part of) the original ERTA ruling
where the Court put forward the possibility of EU law being affected as the
relevant threshold.86
Conceptualizing the ERTA effect as a form of pre-emption at the same time
explains why the Court finds it immaterial that provisions are inserted in the
international agreement (to be) concluded by Member States that confirm
the primacy of EU law or lay down a disconnection clause.87 The pre-emptive
effect emanates from the common EU rules themselves, denying the Member
84. Similarly in Opinion 2/92, the Court was able, without defining the precise area, to find
that EU law was not affected as it was “undisputed that [the common EU] measures do not
cover all the fields of activity to which the Third [OECD] Decision relates.” See Opinion 2/92,
Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national treatment, para 34. The OECD Decision
related to national treatment of foreign undertakings in relation to all economic field of
activities, only some of which (e.g. air transport, access to local credit, fiscal harmonization,
public contracts, etc.) had been the subject of common EU rules.
85. The EU rules in certain respects granted more extensive rights to workers than the ILO
Convention, while the latter in turn had a broader scope than the EU rules. According to Raux,
the Court was preoccupied with the risk that the scope of the EU rules would be altered. See
Raux, “L’avis de la Cour du 19 mars 1993 (Avis 2/91) à propos de: La Convention n° 170 de
l’OIT concernant la sécurité dans l’utilisation des produits chimiques au travail”, (1994) RMC,
45–52, 50. See also Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark, para 82.
86. Case 22/70, ERTA, compare para 22 with para 17.
87. Case C-467/98, Commission v.Denmark, para 105; Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention,
para 130. In the latter case, the Court did stress the special nature of a disconnection clause in
an international private law convention, but it seems difficult to restrict the Court’s reasoning to
this type of agreements.
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States any authority to agree on provisions to which (e.g.) a disconnection
clause would subsequently be applied.
4.6. Drawing consequences from finding an ERTA effect
Although it would appear so from the Court’s case law, the finding that EU
law is affected in itself is rarely the final step in an enquiry. Since the Court
found against field pre-emption, the consequence of finding an ERTA effect is
not simply an exclusive competence over the entire field (and thus the
international agreement in question). Instead, the subsequent question to be
addressed is whether Member States may still retain competence for parts of
the agreement that do not come under the common EU rules that are
affected.88 In Opinion 2/91, the Court came to a nuanced position by finding
that there may be an exclusive EU competence for the whole of (a part of) the
agreement also when the EU counterpart largely (but not entirely) covers the
area in question.89
While the “area largely covered” test thus helps in determining the
consequences of a finding of an ERTA effect, the ECJ in its subsequent rulings
confused its own test by suggesting that the test could be applied to determine
whether EU law is affected itself (i.e. if the area is largely covered by EU rules,
the latter would be affected).90 The Court seemed to imply as such in Open
Skies.91 This would come dangerously close to equating the simple existence
of EU rules with a finding of an ERTA effect, something later ruled out by the
Court in Mox Plant,92 and would have indicated an evolution towards field
88. Evidently this is different for those cases (typically brought pursuant to Art. 258 TFEU)
where Member States have acted on their own. Here the question is not how extensive EU
exclusive competence is, but merely whether there is such competence.
89. This is clear in the original Opinion where the Court had to determine whether the
ERTA effect resulted in an exclusive competence for the whole of the third part of the
Convention: Opinion 2/91, ILO Convention, paras. 25–26; Case C-467/98, Commission v.
Denmark, para 82.
90. While para 34 of Opinion 2/92, Third Revised Decision of the OECD on national
treatment, could be read as meaning that any ERTA effect (even if it had been found) would not
result in an exclusive competence for the entire decision, it could also be read as constituting
part of the test for finding an ERTA effect itself.
91. Case C-467/98,Commission v.Denmark, para 82. Similarly in Opinion 2/00,Cartagena
Protocol, the Court ruled out that the EU had exclusive competence since the common EU rules
covered “only a very small part” of the area of biosafety, para 46. While the ECJ had only
remarked this for the sake of completeness (the Commission’s only claim being that the
Convention (partially) came under the Common Commercial Policy), the statement could have
been read as suggesting that there is no ERTA effect unless the area is largely covered.
92. Case C-495/03, Commission v. Ireland, EU:C:2006:345, paras. 104–106.
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pre-emption.93 In the proceedings on Opinion 1/03, the UK therefore invited
the Court to do away with the test all together.94 The Court did not act upon the
UK’s invitation, but noted that before drawing conclusions, any “assessment
must be based not only on the scope of the rules in question but also on their
nature and content. It is also necessary to take into account not only the current
state of Community law in the area in question but also its future development,
insofar as that is foreseeable at the time of that analysis.”95 Unfortunately
rather than relying on the area largely covered test to determine the necessary
conclusions from a prior finding of EU law being affected, the Court thereby
still presented the test as a way to determine whether EU law is affected.96
This would of course be wrong on purely logical grounds and in light of the
ILO Opinion: if the area regulated by a hypothetical international agreement is
largely covered by EU rules but both the agreement and the common EU rules
provide for minimum harmonization, EU law is not affected by definition.
Still, even if such an area is not largely covered by common EU rules, this
does not mean that finding an ERTA effect is rendered irrelevant.97 This is
foremost so in cases where Member States are alleged to have disregarded an
EU exclusive competence,98 in contrast to those cases in which (typically) the
Commission claims an exclusive EU competence for the whole of the
agreement. As was already apparent from Opinion 2/91,99 the Court in Open
Skies again confirmed that testing for an ERTA effect is not necessarily a
question of finding exclusive EU authority for the whole of the agreement.
Instead it went into some detail defining the different subject matters covered
by the Member States’ bilateral agreements, identifying specific areas such as
the setting of fares and rates, the conditions for offering or using computerized
reservation systems and the allocation of slots at airports, as matters subject to
common EU rules.100 Thus, even if most of the agreements’ provisions did not
affect EU law, the fact that a limited number of provisions did, meant that the
Member States could not conclude the agreements without the EU. To reverse
a well-known metaphor: one tiny element of ERTA effect as a result of
93. Reading it as field pre-emption indeed, see Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 7,
677.
94. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, paras. 47 et seq.
95. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 126. See also supra note 30. As noted above,
this should be restrictively interpreted since if it were to include mere Commission proposals,
the Commission could unilaterally influence an ERTA assessment.
96. Contra, and equating the area largely covered test with finding an ERTA effect, see
Nowak and Masuhr, “‘EU only’: Die ausschließlichen impliziten Außenkompetenzen der
Europäischen Union”, 50 EuR (2015), 189–205, 201–203.
97. See Castillo de la Torre, op. cit. supra note 9, p. 162.
98. See also supra note 88.
99. See supra note 89.
100. Case C-467/98, Commission v. Denmark, paras. 98, 103 and 106.
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obstacle pre-emption in an agreement that otherwise would come under
exclusive Member State competence, prevents a Member State from
concluding the agreement on its own.
5. Development of the ERTA case law following the Lisbon Treaty
In light of the Laeken Declaration’s call to “clarify, simplify and adjust the
division of competence between the Union and the Member States,”101 the
Treaty of Lisbon introduced Articles 216(1) and 3(2) TFEU on the existence
and nature of the EU’s competence to conclude international agreements.
Both provisions aimed to codify the Court’s jurisprudence on implied
competences in external relations.102
Article 216(1) TFEU Article 3(2) TFEU
The Union may conclude an
international agreement
– where the Treaties so provide
– where this is necessary in order to
achieve, within the framework of the
Union’s policies, one of the objectives
referred to in the Treaties
– when a legally binding Union act
provides so
– when the agreement is likely to affect
common rules or alter their scope.
The Union has exclusive competence to
conclude an international agreement
– when its conclusion is provided for in
a legislative act of the Union [Opinion
1/94]
– if the agreement is necessary to
enable the Union to exercise its internal
competence [Opinion 1/76]
– or insofar as its conclusion may affect
common rules or alter their scope
[ERTA]
Ever since both Articles were first drafted for inclusion in the abandoned
Constitutional Treaty, they have been the subject of much academic critique.
First, the scenarios foreseen in both Articles are described similarly, which
blurs the fundamental difference between the existence and nature of EU
external competence,103 even more so given the lack of any cross-referencing
101. Conclusion of the Laeken European Council, SN 300/1/01 REV 1, 21.
102. Passos and Marquardt, “International agreements – Competences, procedures and
judicial control”, in Amato, Bribosia and de Witte (Eds.),Genèse et destinée de la Constitution
européenne – Genesis and destiny of the European Constitution (Bruylant, 2007), p. 891.
103. Cremona, “The Union’s external action: Constitutional perspectives”, in Amato,
Bribosia and de Witte, op. cit. supra note 102, pp. 1184–1189. Schütze, “Lisbon and the federal
order of competences: A prospective analysis”, 33 EL Rev. (2008), 709–722,5, 713–714; Metz,
op. cit. supra note 11, pp. 367–371. Michel also made this observation but evaluated this
positively, see Michel, “Article I-13”, in Burgorgue-Larsen (Ed.), Traité établissant une
Constitution pour l’Europe. Parties I et IV:Architecture constitutionnelle: Commentaire article
par article (Bruylant, 2007), pp. 223–224.
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between the two Articles.104 Second, the Treaty authors’ intent to simplify and
clarify the complex case law on implied exclusive competences came at the
expense of precision,105 inter alia leading to the observation that the EU’s
external competences might be extended compared to the status quo.106
Perhaps the most outspoken critique on Article 3(2) TFEU came from
Dashwood, who disputed that the Court’s case law had been faithfully107
codified, and even suggested that no second paragraph should have been
added to Article 3 TFEU in the first place: “AETR and Opinion 1/76 represent
an application of the principle of loyal cooperation … and they would be
perfectly well preserved through … Article [4(3) TFEU].”108
While the above objections are all well-founded, the criticism itself seems
too harsh in light of the purpose pursued by the Treaty authors in drafting
Article 3(2) TFEU. In essence, Article 3(2) TFEU makes clear (to the citizen)
that there are situations in which the EU (exceptionally) acquires an exclusive
entitlement to act at the expense of the Member States as subjects of
international law in their own right. Such an explicit recognition is
indispensable if one is to give a complete picture of the EU’s federal order of
104. Cremona, op. cit. supra note 103, p. 1188; Fassbender, “Die Völkerrechtssubjektivität
der Europäischen Union nach dem Entwurf des Verfassungsvertrage”, 42 Arch. VR (2004),
26–43, 33–34. In addition to confusing the existence with the nature of external competence,
Kuijper criticized the codification in Art. 216(1) TFEU because it did not capture the full
breadth of ERTA. See Kuijper, Of Mixity and Double-hatting: EU External Relations Law
Explained (Vossiuspers UvA, 2008), pp. 16–17.
105. This lack of precision has also been qualified as an erroneous codification of the case
law; see Schütze, op. cit. supra note 103, 714. Dutheil de la Rochère went as far as claiming that
“[ces dispositions] ne reflètent pas la jurisprudence de la Cour”, see Dutheil de la Rochère,
“Fédéralisation de l’Europe? Le problème de la clarification des compétences entre l’Union et
les États”, in Beaud (Ed.), L’Europe en voie de constitution: Pour un bilan critique des travaux
de la Convention (Bruylant, 2004), p. 326 (emphasis added).
106. Craig, op. cit. supra note 5, 330–331; Cremona, op. cit. supra note 103, pp.
1185–1186; Michel, op. cit. supra note 103, p. 223; Dutheil de la Rochère, op. cit. supra note
105. Epiney noted this specifically for the necessity-scenario, see Epiney, “Außenbeziehungen
von EU und Mitgliedstaaten: Kompetenzverteilung, Zusammenwirken und wechselseitige
Pflichten am Beispiel des Datenschutzes”, 74 ZaöRV (2014), 465–503, 482. Nettesheim on the
other hand found this to be the case for the scenario where the conclusion is provided for in a
legislative act, see Nettesheim, “Die Kompetenzordnung im Vertrag über eine Verfassung für
Europa”, 39 EuR (2004), 511–546, 532–533. See also Schütze, op. cit. supra note 103, 713.
107. The Praesidium of the Convention had boldly asserted current Art. 3(2) TFEU
“faithfully reflects Court of Justice case law on the Union’s exclusive competence to conclude
international agreements.” See Secretariat of the European Convention, Draft Constitution –
Volume I, CONV 724/1/03 REV 1, 71.
108. Dashwood, “The relationship between the Member States and the European
Union/European Community”, in McDonnell (Ed.), A Review of Forty Years of Community
Law: Legal Developments in the European Communities and the European Union (Kluwer
Law International, 2005), p. 55. Explicitly concurring with Dashwood, see Cremona, op. cit.
supra note 103, p. 1186.
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competences and how these are concretely exercised. In this regard, no
constitutional charter could fulfil the promise of presenting a complete,
accurate and veracious picture.
In the meantime the relationship between Articles 3 and 216 TFEU has
partially been clarified by the ECJ.109 In its Opinion on the Singapore FTA, the
Court held that the last scenarios foreseen in both Articles are indeed one and
the same.110 That this does not apply for the scenario in which EU action is
necessary in the sense that it contributes to the realization of the objectives of
the TFEU, was made explicit by the Court in both its Singapore Opinion and
Germany v. Council.111 An (external) act may be necessary to achieve the
EU’s objectives, without being necessary to allow the EU to exercise its
internal competences.
5.1. Article 3(2) TFEU as a (partial) codification of ERTA?
In the first cases on Article 3(2) TFEU, a number of Member States, similarly
to the UK in Opinion 1/03, sought to interpret the Treaty provision as a
restrictive interpretation of ERTA to the effect that its “area largely covered”
component could not be applied anymore. Different Advocates General were
unimpressed by this,112 and so was the Court when it ruled in Case C-114/12,
Neighbouring Rights, that the provision “must … be interpreted in the light of
the Court’s explanation with regard to them in the judgment in ERTA and in
the case law developed as from that judgment.”113 As a result, just like in
Opinion 1/03, the Member States failed to have the Court overturn this
elaboration of ERTA by Opinion 2/91.114 Of course, the Court’s laconic
statement will not have convinced many of its sceptics, and it exposes the
Court to the evident critique that it somehow treats its own (pre-Lisbon) case
law as a supra-constitutional norm.
109. A different debate is whether Art. 216(1) TFEU could serve as a (material) legal basis
for concluding international agreements, see Govaere, “Setting the international scene: EU
external competence and procedures post-Lisbon revisited in the light of Opinion 1/13”, 52
CML Rev. (2015), 1277–1307, 1288. Arguing for, see Konstadinidis, op. cit. supra note 11,
521–522. Arguing against, see Cremona, op. cit. supra note 11, p. 135.
110. Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, EU:C:2017:376, paras. 171–172.
111. Ibid., paras. 237–239; Case C-600/14,Germany v.Council, EU:C:2017:935, paras. 50
and 58.
112. Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-137/12, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2013:441,
para 112; Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Neighbouring
Rights), EU:C:2014:224, para 96; View of A.G. Jääskinen in Opinion 1/13, The Hague
Convention, EU:C:2014:2292, paras. 68–70.
113. Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Neighbouring Rights), para 67.
114. The Court in Case C-114/12,Neighbouring Rights simply rejected the Member States’
restrictive reading of Art. 3(2) TFEU without arguing why; see para 72.
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Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights also revealed a more fundamental,
and as a result more problematic, issue regarding the codification of the ERTA
doctrine: it is clear that the internal “common rules” are adopted pursuant to
shared competences,115 resulting in a pre-emption of external Member State
action. Yet the Treaty authors had focused on the language of the Court’s
judgments and thus inserted the codifying provision in Article 3 TFEU, which
deals with exclusive competences. As a result, when the Member States
invoked Protocol No. 25 in which they had clarified that the exercise of shared
competences does not result in field pre-emption,116 the Court could easily
dismiss this argument noting that the Protocol refers to the exercise of shared
competences under Article 2(2) TFEU. Since the ERTA test had been codified
in Article 3(2) TFEU, the Protocol was irrelevant in an ERTA assessment.117
Here the Court clearly followed the letter of the Treaty in disregard of the
mechanism underlying supervening exclusivity and the fact that it actually
involves shared external competences. A further practical consequence of this
qualification relates to the principle of subsidiarity which becomes
inapplicable if competences are qualified as exclusive.118 This is not to say
that there are no practical merits to the Court’s decision on this point.As noted
above, the Court was actually confronted with a lack of clarity in the EU
Treaties themselves. Its decision has now made clear that for the assessment
of external action, only Article 3(2) TFEU is relevant.119
5.2. The telos and nature of supervening exclusivity
In its post-Lisbon case law, the Court seems to have crystalized the telos of
supervening exclusivity in a standardized test elaborated from the one in
Opinion 1/03, referring to supervening exclusivity as asking the question
115. See Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 140;
Case C-66/13, Green Network, EU:C:2014:2399, para 35.
116. The sole Article of Protocol No. 25 reads: “With reference to Art. 2(2) of the Treaty on
the Functioning of the European Union on shared competence, when the Union has taken action
in a certain area, the scope of this exercise of competence only covers those elements governed
by the Union act in question and therefore does not cover the whole area.”
117. Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 73. A.G. Kokott, A.G. Sharpston and A.G.
Jääskinen agreed on this point with the Court, see Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-137/12,
Commission v. Council, para 115. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Neighbouring
Rights, para 93; View of A.G. Jääskinen in Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, paras. 71–72.
Agreeing with the Court but equally noting that both Arts. 2(2) and 3(2) TFEU prescribe a form
of pre-emption, see Le Bot, op. cit. supra note 11, 636.
118. Discussing in greater detail the possible application of the principle of subsidiarity to
Art. 3(2) TFEU, see Bosse-Platière, “L’application du principe de subsidiarité dans le cadre de
l’action extérieure de l’Union européenne”, in Neframi and Gatti (Eds.), Constitutional Issues
of EU External Relations (Nomos, 2018).
119. I would like to thank the reviewers for drawing my attention to this.
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“whether the agreement is capable of undermining the uniform and consistent
application of the EU rules and the proper functioning of the system which
they establish.”120 As far as the nature of supervening exclusivity goes, the
Court’s post-Lisbon case law confirms that the Court will essentially look for
obstacle pre-emption. This is not to say there is no further development on this
point. Indeed, the Court seems to define the objectives pursued by secondary
legislation more abstractly, resulting in the threshold for obstacle pre-emption
being met more easily.
In Green Network the Court found that even if the directive at issue left the
Member States significant leeway to work out support schemes for renewable
energy, it still barred them from concluding bilateral agreements with third
countries since that would ultimately undermine the directive’s objective of
increasing renewable energy production in the EU.121 This part of the Court’s
reasoning, looking beyond the actual rules laid down in the “common rules”
and by focusing on the objectives, reconfirmed that supervening exclusivity
requires a test of obstacle pre-emption.122
Similarly, in its Opinion 1/13, the Court found that there was a risk of the
Hague Convention affecting the relevant EU regulation (i) given the overlap
and the close connection between the two and (ii) because the regulation laid
down uniform rules.123 The first reason identified by the Court is problematic
since it essentially repeated the Court’s earlier finding that the regulation
covered the Convention to a large extent.124 However, and as already noted,
such a finding in itself is insufficient to result in an ERTA effect.125 This
underscores the importance of the second reason identified by the Court, i.e.
that the regulation defined a uniform system. This reason is akin to the case of
exhaustive harmonization: if the EU legislature intended to define a uniform
system, any overlap with an international law instrument will result in an
ERTA effect, given that the latter does not require a conflict of rules.
In Opinion 3/15, the Court based its finding of EU exclusive competence
inter alia on the consideration that the discretion which the Member States did
120. See infra note 153.
121. Case C-66/13, Green Network, para 60.
122. This reasoning was even clearer in theA.G.’s Opinion, see Opinion ofA.G. Bot in Case
C-66/13, Green Network, paras. 69–71.
123. Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, EU:C:2014:2303, paras. 85–86.
124. Ibid., para 83.
125. The issue in Opinion 1/13 was different from the IMO case because Regulation
725/2004 itself incorporates the ISPS as binding under EU law on the Member States even if it
is non-binding under international law, see supra note 69. In contrast, Regulation (EC)
2201/2003 of 27 Nov. 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of
judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing
Regulation (EC) 1347/2000 (O.J. 2003, L 338/1) simply supplements the Hague Convention,
see View of A.G. Jääskinen in Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para 84.
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enjoy under the EU directive could not “be used in such a way as to
compromise the objectives of Directive 2001/29 which relate … to the
establishment of a high level of protection for authors and to the smooth
functioning of the internal market.”126 This element, just like the ones
mentioned above all confirm that the Court will essentially look for a potential
risk that the objectives of common EU rules will be frustrated and that
supervening exclusivity results from obstacle pre-emption.
While this essentially confirms pre-Lisbon case law, the Court seems
increasingly inclined to rule in favour of finding supervening exclusivity (see
below) – as is also illustrated by the above quotation from Opinion 3/15: by
qualifying the telos of supervening exclusivity itself as the objective pursued
by the directive, the Court sets up a circular reasoning destined to find an
ERTA effect.127 Yet it needs no further explaining that not only the Member
States but also the persuasiveness of the Court’s own reasoning would benefit
from a more rigorous approach that identifies specific objectives for the
common EU rules in play which are more concrete than the overarching
abstract telos of supervening exclusivity itself.
As noted above, one should not hope, following the Court’s assessment of
the relevance of Protocol No. 25 in Neighbouring Rights, that the Court itself
will recognize that supervening exclusivity results from pre-emption rather
than being concerned with an actual exclusive competence.128 After all,
recognizing it as pre-emption results in the finding that the power but not the
competence is exclusive.129 Putting this point differently: under the principle
of conferral, both the existence and nature of EU competences are static and
fixed in the Treaties. The dynamic aspect of the ERTA doctrine lies in its
pre-emptive effect, barring Member States from exercising a shared
competence, reserving the exercise of this competence (i.e. the power)
exclusively to the EU.
The Court’s disregard of the pre-emptive nature of its own ERTA doctrine
also required it to perform legal acrobatics in the Green Network case: while
Italian law made the recognition of Swiss certificates dependent on the
conclusion of a bilateral agreement between both countries, such an
agreement had not actually been concluded yet. But if Italy had not actually
exercised an external competence, how could it have infringed the EU’s
exclusive competence? Advocate General Bot, followed in this by the Court,
conjured up the idea of EU rules being theoretically affected, in addition to the
126. Opinion 3/15,Marrakesh Treaty, EU:C:2017:114, para 124 (emphasis added).
127. See also the Court’s finding in Case C-114/12,Commission v.Council (Neighbouring
Rights) that the EU directives at issue constitute “a harmonized legal framework which seeks,
in particular, to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market”, para 79.
128. Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights; see also supra note 10.
129. For the distinction between power and competence, see supra note 19.
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possibility of EU law being potentially affected.130 Yet the issue is much less
confused if looked at through the lens of pre-emption: by adopting Directive
2001/77 the EU legislature had pre-empted any external action by Member
States, a power which they evidently could not re-arrogate to themselves
under national law. This also explains a further development ofERTA inGreen
Network, where the Court ruled that not only the Italian State was precluded
from concluding an international agreement with Switzerland, but that both
countries’ electricity grid managers were also precluded from concluding an
agreement between themselves.131 This extension of ERTA is straightforward
in light of the doctrine’s pre-emptive nature, but much less so in light of the
actual wording of Article 3(2) TFEU.
A further interesting issue surfaced in Pringle where the Member States
had concluded an inter se agreement. Advocate General Kokott rejected the
relevance of Article 3(2)TFEU, finding that supervening exclusivity is only in
play when international agreements with third countries or international
organizations are concluded.132 The Court in contrast brushed over the issue
and ruled that Article 3(2) TFEU could pre-empt inter se agreements, but
found that there was no ERTA effect in casu. In light of the telos of
supervening exclusivity it is clear that the Advocate General’s conclusion was
the better of the two, the legal effects of the agreement being contained within
the larger European legal order – even if this does not rule out that the EU
Council adopting the EFSM Regulation might still have pre-empted Member
State action (a question not addressed by the Court, see further below). While
not so much comforted by the telos of theERTA doctrine, the Court’s approach
was still consistent with the actual text of Article 3(2) TFEU which simply
refers to “international agreements”.133
5.3. The species of common rules
The Court in Neighbouring Rights took care to note that “[t]he assessment of
the existence of a risk that common EU rules will be adversely affected, or that
130. Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case C-66/13, Green Network, para 83; Case C-66/13, Green
Network, para 38.
131. Case C-66/13, Green Network, paras. 69–73.
132. View of A.G. Kokott in Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:675, para 98. Agreeing
with the A.G., see de Witte and Beukers, “The Court of Justice approves the creation of the
European Stability Mechanism outside the EU legal order: Pringle”, 50 CML Rev. (2013),
805–848, 835.
133. That Art. 3(2) TFEU requires these international agreements to be concluded by the
Union cannot be held against the Court, since international agreements only need to be
concluded by the Union when EU law is affected. When the Court found that EU law is not
affected in the sense of Art. 3(2) TFEU it could conclude that that provision does not apply and
that the Member States had retained full competence to conclude the ESM.
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their scope will be altered, by international commitments cannot be dependent
on an artificial distinction based on the presence or absence of such rules in
one and the same instrument of EU law.”134 The common EU rules may thus
be spread over a number of instruments. However, from the perspective of
obstacle pre-emption this observation seems wholly superfluous. The only
relevant question is whether there is a risk that the realization of common EU
rules’ objectives are frustrated. The Court’s statement, in contrast, suggests
that it is looking for an area that is (largely) covered by EU common rules in
order to infer therefrom a form of field pre-emption.
A more important, and controversial, clarification of the species of
common rules that may be affected came in Opinion 2/15 on the Singapore
Free Trade Agreement. Earlier, in Pringle, the Court had suggested that a
provision of primary law could be qualified as a “common rule”, since it had
ruled that “[t]he establishment of the ESM does not affect the power of the
Union to grant, on the basis of Article 122(2) TFEU, ad hoc financial
assistance to a Member State.”135 Of course, the precedential value of this
finding would always have been limited, giving the exceptional circumstances
in which Pringle was ruled and the consequences thereof for the Court’s odd
application (to say the least) of the ERTA doctrine. In the quoted passage, for
instance, the Court refers to a power of the EU not being affected, something
which ERTA or obstacle pre-emption is not concerned with. Instead, the Court
should have assessed whether the EFSM Regulation itself could be affected by
the ESM Treaty. The issue was therefore only really addressed in Opinion
2/15, where the Commission had argued that the provisions on foreign
non-direct investment in the FTA were subject to an exclusive EU competence
since these provisions would affect Article 63 TFEU which prohibits
restrictions on the free movement of capital between the Member States and
third countries.136 The Council and Member States on the other hand argued
that a primary law provision could not be qualified as a “common rule” in the
sense of the ERTA case law.137 Both Advocate General Sharpston and the
Court rejected the Commission’s reasoning, referring back to the original
134. Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Neighbouring Rights), para 82.
135. Case C-370/12, Pringle, EU:C:2012:756, para 104. The Court linking this (in para
105) to the fact that the EU does not have a specific competence to establish a mechanism such
as the ESM was referred to as sibylline by Weiß and Haberkamm, “Der ESM vor dem EuGH –
Widersprüchliche Wertungen in Luxemburg und Karlsruhe?”, (2013) EuZW, 95–99, 96.
136. Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 16. For an earlier argument by the Commission to
this effect, see COM(2010)343, Communication from the Commission to the European
Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions – Towards a comprehensive European international investment policy, 8.
137. Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 25.
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ERTA ruling.138 By doing so however, the ERTA judgment itself is (again)
beatified into a supra-constitutional norm overriding Article 3(2)TFEU itself.
In addition, the Court postulated that such broad construction of the notion
of common rules would also go against the reasoning underlying supervening
exclusivity.139 The Court subsequently seems confused when it notes that
“in the light of the primacy of the EU and FEU Treaties over acts adopted
on their basis, those acts, including agreements concluded by the
European Union with third States, derive their legitimacy from those
Treaties and cannot, on the other hand, have an impact on the meaning or
scope of the Treaties’ provisions. Those agreements accordingly cannot
‘affect’ rules of primary EU law or ‘alter their scope’, within the meaning
of Article 3(2) TFEU.”140
This passage ignores the point thatERTA addresses the problem of agreements
concluded by Member States (not by the EU institutions) that affect EU law,
and that the primacy of EU primary law cannot be used as an argument against
supervening exclusivity.141 As noted above, a full enforcement of the primacy
of secondary EU law would obviate the need for supervening exclusivity in
the first place.142 Finally, the Court’s decision on this point leads to the ironic
consequence that a provision of primary law that is self-executing, in the sense
that it does not even require the adoption of further secondary legislation for
facilitating the realization of its objectives,143 does not pre-empt Member
State external action, while non-self-executing provisions of primary law
indirectly do, if and when secondary legislation is adopted. Perhaps the
strongest argument in favour of the Court’s finding is that otherwise
supervening exclusivity pursuant to Article 3(2) TFEU and a priori
exclusivity under Article 3(1) TFEU would be conflated (also for
non-self-executing provisions).144 This risk would seem especially real given
that the Court has been more keen on finding exclusivity pursuant to Article
138. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, EU:C:2016:992, para
352; Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 233.
139. Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 234.
140. Ibid., para 235.
141. See also Verellen, “Het Hof van Justitie en het EU-Singapore handelsakkoord, of de
kunst van het koorddansen”, 66 SEW (2018), 31–33, 31–32.
142. Cremona seems to ignore this when she notes that the Court’s reasoning on this point
is legally stronger than its reference to the original ERTA ruling; see Cremona, “Shaping EU
trade policy post-Lisbon: Opinion 2/15 of 16 May 2017”, 14 EUConst (2018), 231–259, 248.
143. Here, self-executing thus implies but does not equate with directly effective. See inter
alia Case 2/74, Reyners, EU:C:1974:68, paras. 29–31; Case 33/74, Van Binsbergen,
EU:C:1974:131, paras. 21 and 26.
144. See also Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 358. I
would like to thank the external reviewers for drawing my attention to this.
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3(2) TFEU. The Court’s decision on this point may then have been a trade-off
for effectively lowering the bar for finding an ERTA effect.
5.4. Testing and finding an ERTA effect
5.4.1. Per se no ERTA effect
The obvious approach for Member States to take in cases where the
Commission claims EU exclusive competence is to argue that one of the
scenarios in which the Court earlier found there to be (per se) no ERTA effect
also applies in casu. Indeed, in Opinion 1/13 the Member States refuted the
Commission’s claim that the EU regulation would be affected if Member
States could individually decide on third countries’ adhesion to the Hague
Convention by arguing that the resulting inconsistencies between the Member
States would merely amount to practical difficulties.145 Similarly, one of the
arguments of the Member States in Neighbouring Rights and Opinion 3/15
was that the common EU rules invoked by the Commission only constituted
minimum harmonization
However, on both occasions in which the latter argument was made, the
Court relied on an interpretation similar to the one it employed in Opinion
1/03,146 whereby EU provisions that prima facie leave discretion to the
Member States are read as provisions through which the EU legislature
exhaustively regulates an issue (even if in an open ended manner).147 In
Neighbouring Rights, Member States claimed that the relevant EU directive
only foresees an exclusive right for wireless retransmission, while the
Convention under negotiation could also create such a right for retransmission
by wire or cable. To the Advocate General, this meant that EU law only
provided for minimum harmonization, leaving the necessary legal space for
the Member States to adopt rules on other means of retransmission (be it at
national or international level).148 The Court, by contrast, interpreted the
directive as laying down an exhaustive definition of the right of
retransmission, meaning any other (or even identical) definition in the
convention would affect the directive.149 In Opinion 3/15, the Member States
relied on the fact that the relevant directive gave them the freedom to limit
copyright protection for the benefit of persons with disabilities, an option
which they could choose to exercise (in national law or) by adhering to the
145. Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para 64. See supra note 26.
146. See supra note 76.
147. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, paras. 148–149.
148. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Neighbouring
Rights), para 150.
149. Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, paras. 91–92.
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Marrakesh Treaty. The Court inverted this reasoning by finding that this
discretion (on the part of the Member States) was not the result of a negative
choice of the EU legislature (i.e. deciding not to decide and leave a matter to
the Member States).150 The EU legislature’s positive choice then pre-empted
the Member States from acting on the international plane.
5.4.2. Codifying the methodology for finding an ERTA effect
As far as methodology goes, the Court in its post-Lisbon cases has introduced
a novel step since it is typically required to first determine which of the
different scenarios listed in Article 3(2) TFEU is the relevant one to test in
casu.151 In its first cases on Article 3(2) TFEU, the Court also significantly
built further on its own codification in Opinion 1/03 by developing its
standard test as follows:
“any competence, especially where it is exclusive, must have its basis in
conclusions drawn from a comprehensive and detailed analysis of the
relationship between the envisaged international agreement and the EU
law in force. That analysis must take into account the areas covered by the
EU rules and by the provisions of the agreement envisaged, their
foreseeable future development and the nature and content of those rules
and those provisions, in order to determine whether the agreement is
capable of undermining the uniform and consistent application of the EU
rules and the proper functioning of the system which they establish.”152
At first sight, this single statement simply brings together the different
elements of the Court’s pre-Lisbon jurisprudence. However, it must be noted
that the Court originally introduced the assessment of the “scope, nature and
content” of the common EU rules in Opinion 1/03 only in relation to the “area
largely covered test”.153 Now this assessment is generalized,154 and if this
rewording of the methodology is interpreted as correcting the Court’s earlier
suggestions that the “area largely covered test” may be used to find an ERTA
effect itself (see above), it is indeed to be welcomed.155 Showing a remarkable
sense of consistency then, the Court has repeated verbatim its standardized
150. Opinion 3/15,Marrakesh Treaty, para 119.
151. Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para 70; Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights,
para 65; Opinion 3/15,Marrakesh Treaty, paras. 102–104.
152. Opinion 1/13, The Hague Convention, para 74. Similarly, see Case C-114/12,
Neighbouring Rights, para 74; Case C-66/13, Green Network, para 33; Opinion 3/15,
Marrakesh Treaty, para 108.
153. Opinion 1/03, Lugano Convention, para 126.
154. Noting the very same change but drawing different conclusions, see Verellen, op. cit.
supra note 42, 406–407.
155. Contra and very critical, see Verellen, op. cit. supra note 42, 406–408.
Implied exclusive powers 1131
test in all post-Lisbon cases,156 up until Opinion 2/15 when it disappeared
again from the Court’s ERTA assessment.
In her Opinion in Neighbouring Rights, Advocate General Sharpston
proposed a further development of the methodology by arguing that the
“analysis always involves examining (in sequence): (i) the scope and content
of the envisaged international agreement; (ii) whether the European Union has
already exercised an internal competence and, if so, the scope and content of
EU law; and (iii) whether the conclusion of that international agreement may
affect EU rules or alter their scope.”157 In her Opinion on the Singapore FTA,
Advocate General Sharpston tweaked her approach by noting that the first
step also requires defining the area concerned by the international agreement,
in order to verify in a second step whether the area is fully harmonized or
largely covered by EU secondary legislation.158
This again shows some confusion over the role of the “area largely covered
test”.159 On the one hand, the Advocate General rightly notes that meeting this
test does not in and of itself mean there will be exclusive competence, a further
analysis always being required.160 Yet, unless the position is taken that
“largely covering the area” is a necessary but insufficient condition for finding
anERTA effect, applying the test in the second step of her approach is pointless
for finding such an effect in itself.161 In this regard, it would have been useful
if the Advocate General had made explicit that she relied on the test as the
starting point of her analysis,162 because the Commission did not simply claim
EU exclusive competence for some provisions of the chapter, but for the entire
chapter. The latter claim indeed requires (i) EU law to be affected and (ii) the
chapter to be at least largely covered by EU rules, whereas the former claim
only requires the first of these two conditions to be met.
156. See cases cited supra note 152.
157. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Commission v. Council (Neighbouring
Rights) para 89.
158. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, paras. 122–125.
159. For an interpretation alternative to the present one, see Castillo de la Torre, op. cit.
supra note 9, 165.
160. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 130; Opinion of
A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights. Nowak and Masuhr disagree with
A.G. Sharpston on this point, see Nowak and Masuhr, op. cit. supra note 96, 203.
161. See in this regard also Le Bot’s reading of Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, who
argues that the Court first verified whether the area in question was largely covered, so as to
find that EU law was affected, and subsequently looked for alteration of EU law by those
elements not yet covered by EU rules. This of course begs the question why the test for finding
anERTA effect would be one of “largely (rather than completely) covering the area”, Le Bot, op.
cit. supra note 11, 638–640.
162. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 231.
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5.4.3. Finding an ERTA effect post-Lisbon
Although the standardized test suggests that the Court has not fundamentally
altered its approach to testing for an ERTA effect, a closer scrutiny of the
post-Lisbon cases reveals that the Court may have lowered the required
threshold to trigger supervening exclusivity. In its test, the Court now
consistently refers to a risk of EU law being affected rather than to
establishing a finding that EU law is actually affected.163 Although the Court
in Neighbouring Rights referred to the Open Skies cases on this point, the
aspect of a risk of EU law being affected is absent in the reasoning of the Court
in those cases.164 For this change in emphasis the Opinion of Advocate
General Kokott in Conditional Access seems to have been instrumental: since
Article 3(2) TFEU refers to agreements thatmay affect common rules or alter
their scope, she stressed that the relevant threshold was that of a risk.165
Of course, it may be that this change of emphasis is only semantics which
do not change the outcome of the test. Yet, post-Lisbon the Court also seems
more keen on finding exclusivity then hitherto. In Green Network, the Court
implicitly reversed part of its ruling in Open Skies, since it first found that it
was clear from Article 5 of Directive 2001/77 that “the guarantees of
origin … concern exclusively electricity produced in sites under [Member
States’] jurisdiction and not electricity produced in third States.”166 In light of
Open Skies, where EU legislation also only dealt with EU carriers, one could
then assume that the Court wouldmutatis mutandis declare that the EU system
of guarantees of origin could not be affected, even if Member States conclude
bilateral agreements with third countries whereby the latter’s guarantees of
origin (in Open Skies: granting third countries fifth freedom rights) are
163. Case C-66/13,GreenNetwork, para 29; Opinion 1/13, TheHagueConvention, para 71;
Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 68; Opinion 3/15, Marrakesh Treaty, para 105;
Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 180.
164. It can however, be traced back to the original ERTA case, in which the Court both
referred to EU law being actually affected (in para 17) and the possibility of EU law being
affected (in para 22). It may not be a coincidence then that the Court in Case C-114/12,
Neighbouring Rights (para 66) referred to para 22 rather than para 17 of the ERTA judgment in
interpreting Art. 3(2) TFEU.
165. Opinion of A.G. Kokott in Case C-137/12, Commission v. Council, para 100. The
Court itself did not have to take a position in that case, since it ruled that Art. 207 TFEU
constituted the proper legal basis for the Convention at issue. Advocates General Bot and
Jääskinen picked up on A.G. Kokott’s lead in their Opinions in Case C-66/13, Green Network
and Opinion 1/13, Accession of Third States to the Hague Convention. In contrast, in the fourth
major post-Lisbon case in which Art. 3(2) TFEU figured, i.e. Case C-114/12, Neighbouring
Rights,A.G. Sharpston did not yet refer to this risk but in her Opinion on the Singapore FTA she
did; see Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, para 128.
166. Case C-66/13, Green Network, para 41.
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recognized. Questionably though,167 the Court relied on the Directive’s
mutual recognition clause to find that a bilateral agreement such as that
envisaged in Italian law would extend the scope of the Directive and thereby
affect it.168
The Court’s willingness, some might say eagerness, to find exclusivity was
also clear in Neighbouring Rights, where there was uncertainty as to the
precise content of the future Convention. Following the Court’s standardized
test would suggest that such uncertainty should result in finding against
exclusive competence,169 and Advocate General Sharpston indeed noted that
the manner in which the “open issues” would ultimately be addressed in the
Convention would have a bearing on the exclusivity question.170 The Court, in
contrast, restricted itself to the possible solutions listed in the Convention’s
preparatory documents, finding that since the options that might result in
shared competence had not been mentioned as such in those documents, it had
to be assumed that the common rules would be affected.171 This sits uneasily
with the Court’s own finding that it is for the party asserting the existence of
an exclusive competence to demonstrate it.172
The Court’s ruling in Opinion 2/15 provides the latest indication of the
Court’s relaxed standard towards finding supervening exclusivity. The case in
point is the assessment of the EU’s competence to conclude the chapter on
transport services, in particular the provisions on maritime and inland
waterway transport, in the Singapore FTA, where the difference in assessment
by Advocate General Sharpston and the Court were the most salient.173 While
167. The reasoning was questionable since Art. 5(4) of the Directive only requires mutual
recognition of guarantees of origin issued in accordance with Art. 5(2) of the Directive, i.e.
guarantees of origin issued by EU Member States. As noted by A.G. Bot, there was no
guarantee that the guarantees of origin would only be granted (under the agreement) to Swiss
green electricity meeting the definition of the Directive. See Opinion of A.G. Bot in Case
C-66/13, Green Network, para 68. As a result, there would be no EU obligation, under the
mutual recognition clause, on the other Member States to recognize such guarantees of origin.
168. Case C-66/13, Green Network, paras. 46–48.
169. This is because the standardized test starts from the premise that EU competence,
especially if it is exclusive, cannot be presumed. See Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights,
para 75.
170. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Case C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, paras. 155–156.
171. See Case C-114/12,Neighbouring Rights, paras. 95, 99 and 101. It is no doubt relevant
in this regard that the Court set out its analysis by noting that the Convention would be based on
the EU acquis. This would imply that the default situation was one of an ERTA effect. See Case
C-114/12, Neighbouring Rights, para 84.
172. Case C-114/12,Neighbouring Rights, para 75. Emphasizing this novelty in the Court’s
approach to testing the ERTA doctrine, see Abner, “Qui a le droit de négocier les accords
internationaux? – Clarification de la jurisprudence AETR”, 3 R.A.E. (2014), 641–648, 645.
173. In relation to transport by road and rail, the A.G. and the Court came to the same
conclusion in their assessment of the ERTA doctrine. In relation to air transport, the A.G. held
that this area was not largely covered by EU rules (para 250) while the Court held that the
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both the Advocate General and the Court differentiated between the different
modes of transport, only the Advocate General consistently checked the
different modes of supply for each mode of transport. In relation to maritime
transport, she found, just like the Court itself, that modes 1 and 2 (cross-border
supply and consumption abroad) were covered by common EU rules. In
relation to modes 3 (establishment) and 4 (presence of natural persons), the
Advocate General held that these were not or only to a limited extent covered
by rules of secondary EU legislation, and as a result the chapter’s provisions
on maritime transport services did not wholly come under EU exclusive
competence.174
The ECJ in contrast essentially downplayed the relevance of the
commitments in relation to modes 3 and 4.As regards mode 3, the Court noted
that under the specific commitments most Member States were not required to
allow Singaporese undertakings to establish themselves and fly the flag of
those Member States. In relation to mode 4, the Court ruled that there was no
further liberalization since the specific commitments allowed the EU to
impose nationality requirements for ships’ crews. The Court subsequently
held that since common EU rules would be affected and because the area of
maritime services was largely covered by those EU rules, the EU had
exclusive competence. One can only surmise how the ECJ took into account
the commitments under modes 3 and 4, but it appears that the Court found
these limited commitments insufficiently substantial to “broaden” the area
that needed to be covered by common EU rules.175 While both the Advocate
General and the Court therefore referred to the same “nominal” area, i.e. that
of “maritime transport services”, the areas actually defined were different in
scope.
For the area of inland waterway transport, the Commission had argued that
given the EU’s and Singapore’s geographic location, the commitments
entered into were negligible and therefore there was no real exercise of EU
competence and no need to show its exclusive nature.176 Advocate General
Sharpston rejected this line of reasoning and held that a decision not to
aircraft repair and maintenance services and the services for the sale, marketing or reservation
of air transport services covered by the agreement were not inherently linked to air transport,
and therefore did not come under Art. 207(5) TFEU but under the CCP itself. As noted by A.G.
Sharpston however (see para 218) the Court in Opinion 1/08 qualified the very same services as
air transport services coming under the exception of (current) Art. 207(5) TFEU. See Opinion
1/08, GATS, para 169.
174. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, paras. 239–241.
175. According to Dony however, the Court simply ignored the fact that the common EU
rules did not cover the aspect of establishment. See Dony, “L’avis 2/15 de la Cour de justice: Un
‘jugement de Salomon’?”, (2017) RTDE, 525–554, para 15.
176. Opinion of A.G. Sharpston in Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, paras. 172–173.
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commit also requires a competence.177 The Court on the other hand
determined, again on the basis of the reservations set out in the schedule of
specific commitments, that the FTA would not change the status quo and that
the provisions on inland waterway transport could therefore not have a bearing
on the competence question.178 While the Court was more explicit here than
on modes 3 and 4 of maritime transport, it may be argued that the same
reasoning was essentially at play. The Court’s assessment of the provisions on
maritime and inland waterway transport illustrate how finding an exclusive
EU competence remains a subjective affair: by qualifying commitments as
insufficiently significant they can be excised from the area that needs to be
covered by common EU rules. The more that area can be narrowed down, the
easier it will be for EU secondary legislation to cover the area to a large extent
which, when an ERTA effect is found, results in the EU holding exclusive
competence over the whole agreement. The Court thereby facilitates EU
exclusivity by applying the well-established absorption doctrine, not to the
horizontal (intra-EU) question of the legal basis, but to the vertical division of
competences.179
6. Supervening exclusivity in the post-Lisbon era:A first
assessment
Just before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, Kuijper noted that “the
ERTA doctrine has become so complicated as to be almost useless to the
political institutions of the Community as guidance for further actions.”180 As
a corollary to the issue of continuity or discontinuity in the application of
ERTA post-Lisbon, this raises the question whether it has become more
predictable, contributing to greater legal certainty. The analysis above shows
that the latter is indeed the case, albeit mainly as a result of the Court having
lowered the threshold for finding supervening exclusivity.181
Indeed, despite a prima facie continuity, resulting from (i) the Court’s
finding that the ERTA line of cases remains relevant in interpreting Article
3(2) TFEU and (ii) the standard test elaborated from the Lugano Opinion,
177. Ibid. para 226.
178. Opinion 2/15, Singapore FTA, paras. 214–217.
179. Chamon, “Constitutional limits to the political choice for mixity”, in Neframi and
Gatti (Eds.), Constitutional Issues of EU External Relations (Nomos, 2018), pp. 140–144.
Arguing against such a vertical application, see A.G. Kokott in Joined Cases C-626/15 and
C-659/16, Commission v. Council, EU:C:2018:362, para. 82.
180. Kuijper, op. cit. supra note 104, p. 9.
181. Arguing that the ERTA doctrine remains unpredictable in its application, see Verellen,
op. cit. supra note 42, 409.
CML Rev. 20181136 Chamon
there is a general consensus that the Court in post-Lisbon cases is more easily
swayed both into finding an ERTA effect and finding exclusivity for the whole
of an agreement.182 In this regard, especially the Court’s standard test may
have misled some commentators. In any event it seems to have wrong-footed
Advocate General Sharpston in her Opinions in Neighbouring Rights and on
the Singapore FTA when she acted much more faithfully on the Court’s own
instructions (in Opinion 1/03) than the Court would do itself.
The analysis above has revealed the techniques employed by the Court that
firstly lead to an easier finding of an ERTA effect and further lead to a finding
that an area is largely covered by EU rules, which this articles argues is a
prerequisite for concluding that thewhole of an agreement (or a whole section
of it) comes under EU exclusive competences. However, on this last issue
there does not seem to be any consensus in legal doctrine; and the Court’s
post-Lisbon case law has perhaps only exacerbated the confusion on the
precise function of the “area largely covered test”.183
In terms of finding an ERTA effect, there is firstly a semantic and
methodological shift to finding a risk that EU law is affected. Secondly, and
perhaps pointing to a differentiation between Articles 2(2) and 3(2) TFEU,184
the Court systematically qualifies provisions in EU law that leave a certain
regulatory discretion to Member States as an explicit and conscious choice of
the EU legislature, thus preventing Member States from relying on this
freedom to argue against pre-emption. Thirdly, the Court has not shied away
from defining the objective and purpose of the set of EU common rules at
issue in such an abstract way that it almost equates with the telos of the
mechanism of supervening exclusivity itself. The outcome of such a circular
reasoning cannot of course be anything else than finding that EU law is
affected and competence exclusive. Fourthly, in cases where the international
law instrument builds on or is supposed to interact with the common EU rules,
the ECJ effectively (but not explicitly) reverses the default situation to one of
EU law being affected: although the Court explicitly finds that EU
competence, let alone EU exclusive competence, cannot be presumed, its
actual reasoning seems to point in the opposite direction. Turning to the area
182. Rosas, “EU external relations: Exclusive competence revisited”, (2015) Fordham
International Law Journal, 1073–1096, 1087; Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit. supra note 7,
680–681; Kleimann and Kübeck, “The signing, provisional application, and conclusion of trade
and investment agreements in the EU: The case of CETA and Opinion 2/15”, 45 LIEI (2018),
13–45, 39. In more veiled terms, Cremona notes that the Court has not shown “any reluctance
towards reaching a finding of exclusive competence”, see Cremona op. cit supra note 11, p. 146.
183. Compare for instance the present assessment with those of Delgado Casteleiro, op. cit.
supra note 7, 680–681; Verellen, op. cit. supra note 42, 406–409; Le Bot, op. cit. supra note 11,
638–640; Castillo de la Torre, op. cit. supra note 9, pp. 162–168.
184. See supra notes 35 and 53. The Court could read these provisions in secondary law
differently depending on whether internal or external Member State action is at issue.
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largely covered test, the contentious issue is rarely how to define the relevant
area in a nominal sense, rather the deciding factors are how the area is
substantively composed and when the “largely” threshold is met. In Opinion
2/15, the ECJ and the Advocate General both referred to the same areas to be
covered (modes of transport), but the Court effectively defined them more
narrowly, facilitating a passing of the test. Further, even if the areas are
defined identically both in nominal and substantive terms, the fact that they
merely need to be largely covered leaves a significant degree of discretion
which it would be surprising for the Court not to exploit.
Given the ongoing development of EU secondary legislation (or positive
harmonization) and the requirement to also take into account the future
development of EU law when conducting an ERTA test, it seems inevitable
that the Court, pursuant to its lenient approach, will ultimately take exclusive
competence as a rule rather than the exception.185 The Court’s post-Lisbon
case law is therefore not simply an unrestricted continuation of its established
ERTA jurisprudence,186 but also an unrestricted further development thereof.
While the Court’s post-Lisbon case law may still be explained and interpreted
in terms of obstacle pre-emption, it appears that the Court is more willing to
find “obstacles” that effectively trigger the pre-emptive effect.
Space does not permit a discussion of why the Court is so keen on finding
exclusivity in the post-Lisbon era. Suffice to note that the outcome of the
Court’s case law was not predetermined by the new Treaty rules. In this
regard,Azoulai noted that the Court would have broadly three options: a return
to the original “integrative institutionalism”, i.e. the original ERTA reasoning,
a continuation of the practice-inspired “associative institutionalism”, inter
alia favouring reliance on mixed agreements, or a third way where the Court
cedes the field to Member States, given a context of “deep and widespread
concern about the efficiency and the legitimacy of the Union’s actions both
internally and externally.”187 The latter was indeed plausible given the
background of Brexit, rising populism and even revolt from the highest
national judicial benches.188 In a bold move however, the Court has gone for a
renewed integrative institutionalism.
185. Azoulai also observed the ever increasing body of EU legislation, but concluded from
this that a generous ERTA jurisprudence would be hard to maintain; see Azoulai, “The many
visions of Europe: Insights from the reasoning of the European Court of Justice in external
relations law”, in Cremona and Thies (Eds.), The European Court of Justice and External
Relations Law: Constitutional Challenges (Hart Publishing, 2014), p. 176.
186. Nowak and Masuhr, op. cit supra note 96, 191.
187. Azoulai, op. cit. supra note 185, pp. 181–182.
188. See the Czech Constitutional Court in the Landtova saga, 2012/01/31 - Pl. ÚS 5/12:
Slovak Pensions XVII; the German Bundesverfassungsgericht’s preliminary reference in
Gauweiler, 14 Jan. 2014, BVerfGE 134, 366; the Danish Supreme Court’s decision in Ajos, 6
Dec. 2016, Case 15/2014.
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The doctrinal merits and vices of the Court’s post-Lisbon case law have
been commented upon above, leaving the question how this jurisprudence
should be evaluated from a policy perspective. There seems to be a consensus
on the activist role played by the Court, but the reviews thereof are mixed.
While the Court is accused by some of maintaining a confused test for the
strategic use thereof by the Court itself,189 others applaud the Court for its
search for EU exclusive competence, strengthening the EU’s international
role and limiting recourse to mixity with its well-known “handicapping”
features.190 The two constitutional mechanisms of mixity and supervening
exclusivity are indeed communicating vessels,191 and the ultimate question
then becomes how the Court’s application of Article 3(2) TFEU is received by
the Member States.
Reinforcing EU exclusive powers at first sight indeed strengthens the EU’s
international standing, but it may be ineffectual or even counterproductive if
the result is a chilling effect whereby Member States block the adoption of
further EU secondary legislation that would pre-empt them from acting
externally, or when it results in a backlash with Member States insisting on
optionally mixed external EU action.192 At the same time, as Cremona has
noted, exclusivity only rules out unilateral, uncoordinated, Member State
action, but still allows Member States to pursue external action within a
European framework.193 Conversely, the EU may still be an effective
international player together with the Member States if all actors involved act
in accordance with the principle of loyal cooperation. If the past is anything to
go by, the next phase in the Court’s case law would indeed see two types of
cases: (i) after resolving the post-Lisbon competence questions, issues
involving loyal cooperation may come to the forefront again194 and
(ii) depending on the Commission’s appetite, it could try to enforce the
recalibrated ERTA doctrine in individual cases, as it did in Open Skies and
Inland Waterways. In these cases the “area largely covered test” is not as
relevant, since the finding in an international agreement concluded by a
Member State of only one provision affecting common EU rules will still
189. Verellen, op. cit. supra note 42, 409–410.
190. Flaesch-Mougin, op. cit. supra note 6.
191. Dashwood, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 362.
192. Identifying such a “chilling” effect of too sweeping a push for exclusivity, see Weiler.
op. cit. supra note 43, p. 72. See also A.G. Dutheillet de Lamothe in Case 22/70, ERTA,
EU:C:1971:23, p. 292.
193. Cremona, “EU external relations: Unity and conferral of powers”, in Azoulai, op. cit.
supra note 10, pp. 74–77.
194. I would like to thank Christophe Hillion for drawing my attention to this.
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result in the finding that the Member State concerned could not have
concluded that agreement autonomously.195
7. Conclusion
In the Court’s post-Lisbon ERTA case law, the pendulum has continued to
swing (from Opinion 1/03) in a direction favouring EU exclusivity. The
“restrictive” codification of ERTA in Article 3(2) TFEU has not hindered the
Court in doing so, but instead has actually supported this development – not
merely because of its concise and imprecise language, but also because it
erroneously qualifies the ERTA doctrine as one of exclusive competence
rather than pre-emption of shared external competence. One immediate
practical effect of this is that the Court in Neighbouring Rights could dismiss
Protocol No. 25 as being irrelevant when testing ERTA.
Other than that, the codification in the Lisbon Treaty is as good as it could
possibly get: ERTA is a complex judge-made doctrine which does not lend
itself to a perfect codification in one or two lines. What Article 3(2) TFEU
does is make it clear to the EU citizen that, in some instances, the EU acquires
an exclusive “competence” to act externally when a body of EU law has been
adopted internally and it sanctions this judge-made law, allowing its further
development by the ECJ. At least formally the Court itself does not consider
Article 3(2) TFEU as a breaking point and instead emphasizes the continuity
of its pre-Lisbon case law through the standardized test which it elaborated
from its own codification in Opinion 1/03.
In terms of further development, the relevant questions then become
whether the ECJ applies Article 3(2) TFEU in a doctrinally convincing and
coherent manner and whether in doing so it has adequately sensed the
political, economic and social context in which it acts as a constitutional court
for the EU legal order.As to the first question, a sufficient degree of coherence
may indeed be noted, since the Court’s post-Lisbon case law can still be
interpreted from the prism of obstacle pre-emption. The only somewhat
anomalous decision in this regard is the Court’s rejection in Opinion 2/15 of
the qualification of a provision of primary law as a “common rule” in the
sense of ERTA. Otherwise, looking at supervening exclusivity as resulting
from obstacle pre-emption helps understand the Court’s post-Lisbon case law.
Nonetheless, testing for an ERTA effect is inherently a subjective affair. It
requires the proper definition of the subject matter covered by international
and EU rules, the identification of the objective of the EU rules in question,
the assessment whether the subject matter has been fully harmonized under
195. See supra note 88.
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EU law or whether, instead only minimum harmonization is at play, the
assessment whether the objectives of the relevant EU rules risk being
jeopardized in a legal but not in a practical sense, etc. A further element of
obscurity is the precise function of the area largely covered test: does it test an
ERTA effect or does it test whether a whole agreement is covered by EU
exclusive competence? Under obstacle pre-emption it can only be the latter,
but the Court would do well to clarify this.
Whether the Court’s reasoning in its post-Lisbon case law has been
convincing in every instance is a more contentious question. Clearly the Court
has set up new strands of reasoning that more easily result in a finding of EU
exclusivity. The Court has been activist, but this in itself cannot be a reason for
critique. Rather, the Court has played its legitimate role, under the Community
Method, as a constitutional actor safeguarding EU integration. Whether this
new judicial affirmation of EU exclusive external competences will also
herald a new stage in EU external action, will ultimately depend on how the
Court’s reading of Article 3(2) TFEU is received by the Member States and
how it feeds into the EU decision-making process.
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